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Article originally published on 23.10.2018
While serious analysts on both sides of the Pacific openly speak about a new cold war between America and China every single day and proceed to discuss it down to increasingly specific details, in Poland such claims are still quite often considered too hasty and even borderline intellectually extravagant. I believe I was the first one in Poland to put forth such a claim, something I did shortly after listening to Pence’s speech on 4 October.
Immediately following Donald Trump deputy’s speech at the Hudson Institute, a series of major events of extremely high importance began to take place in various parts of the world. We witnessed a plethora of espionage scandals, including a Bloomberg report about China stealing the secrets of US technology giants using microchips, a PRC intelligence officer being arrested in Brussels on charges of technological espionage, as well as the disclosure of operations of the so-called ‘Five-Eye Alliance’ (and attempts to expand it to also include Germany and Japan) aimed at counteracting the Middle Kingdom’s investments and other operations.
Washington also strengthened its support for Taiwan, a fact that immediately increased the tensions between Taipei and Beijing
Preparations for US Navy’s great show of force in the disputed South China Sea are also well underway, as is the process of exerting pressure on any still hesitating allies to join it. This is especially true of Australia, which not only is the key geostrategic ally of the US in the Pacific region but is also strongly connected with Beijing through economic ties and in recent years has been increasingly leaning towards it politically as well. Yet, much more is happening in this part of the world. Rodrigo Duterte, President of the Philippines, which is also very important in terms of geostrategy, ceased using his radically anti-American rhetoric (which was concurrent with his increasing fondness of China) and agreed to hold more joint military exercises with US forces and even to conduct a training exercise codenamed Kamandag (‘Venom’) along with the US and Japan. In addition, the years-long remilitarisation process of the latter country finally came to a symbolic end, as armoured units from the Land of the Rising Sun stepped a foot outside of their home country for the first time since World War II and even suffered a single fatal casualty during the exercise itself. Trump also decided to reactivate the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), i.e. the four-party security collaboration initiative which includes the US, Japan, Australia and India, further tempting and putting pressure on the last one, still sticking with its non-alignment policy, to stand on the side of the US in its conflict with China.
Washington also strengthened its support for Taiwan, a fact that immediately increased the tensions between Taipei and Beijing. Another argument erupted just moments after Pence’s speech, this time concerning the so-called NAFTA 2.0 (actually called USMCA), i.e. a North American trade agreement, with Beijing accusing section 32.10 of this document of being anti-Chinese in nature, as well as the US of undermining the sovereignty of Canada and Mexico and destroying the unity of the World Trade Organization, and the Great White North itself plunging into a heated debate on whether the alliance with the US did not go too far this time. These are (hopefully) merely the most crucial events of the last several days…
What kind of a potential future can we see in this nebula of changes? First of all, this is an obvious escalation of the US-China conflict. At the end of Barack Obama’s final term, the RAND Corporation published a report on various options of a war against the Middle Kingdom (analysed in NK by Jacek Bartosiak) in collaboration with the US Government. The conclusions of this document were brutally clear – the time is working in favour of America’s main rival, so in order to maintain its current position, America must reverse the trends undermining its global hegemony. Earlier this year the US moved from words to action, mainly by the means of a trade war and an increase in military-strategic activity in the Western Pacific region. Now it has taken these actions to a whole new level.
Secondly, we can clearly see that the US’s words correspond to its actions. Pence’s speech was likely the most radical anti-Chinese speech in US history. Dr Witold Sokała and professor Bogdan Góralczyk have already thoroughly analysed it (in the ‘Nowa Konfederacja’ and ‘Obserwator Finansowy’, respectively), so let us briefly summarise its most important aspects. China constitutes a global threat to freedom and security, it steals advanced technology from the West (and then uses it to build digital despotism), it employs unfair commercial practices and is an aggressor state in Southeast Asia region, with a particular focus on the South China Sea. It is a hostile country, which interferes in the internal affairs of the Western countries, including the US elections, and tries to lure away US allies and convince them to stand for China’s interests instead. It is an aggressive empire that practices ‘debt diplomacy’ and exploits the financial problems of smaller countries to take over strategic resources, infrastructure and companies. Finally, it also is a great disappointment to America, who lent Beijing a helping hand in the 1970s to build up China’s prosperity, hoping that the country would soon enter the path of freedom – expectations which ultimately proved futile.
The factor that the Polish commentators likely underestimated the most was contrasting the evil, despotic power held by the Chinese elites with the good Chinese common folk, as well as accusing Xi Jinping of persecuting religious minorities (Buddhists, Muslim Uighurs, Catholics). This is a clear and undoubtedly radical signal that if anyone in China wants to overthrow the current leadership of the country, be that via secessionism like in Tibet, internal political games within the party or even a popular rebellion, they can count on the support of the United States. It is worth noting, for example based on Hillary Clinton’s statement about the Uighurs, that a cross-party consensus regarding this issue is forming across the pond – if it has not already. Additionally, Made in China 2025 – Beijing’s main development programme focused on achieving technological primacy – was presented as a blow to the US’s core interests.
When the Americans pressure both allied and unaligned countries to stand against China, the latter does not hesitate to send weapons to Pakistan, ‘defend Canada’s sovereignty’, and tempt Europe with lucrative deals
The only thing missing from Pence’s speech was the phrase ‘evil empire’. It sounded like a declaration of cold war and was essentially an ultimatum that did not leave many options for Beijing to save face. It also undermined the primary elements of China’s development and foreign policy (including the pro-export model) and clearly announced that the US’s stance in this conflict will be adamant. And concrete actions follow these words every single day.
Thirdly: China’s firm and steadfast response. The Chinese reject the accusations put forth by the Americans and portray themselves as defenders of peace, development and free trade while simultaneously painting the US as a destructive aggressor. Additionally, they do not hesitate to humiliate and scold the top representatives of the US government, just like they did to Mike Pompeo during his visit to China, which took place right after Pence’s speech. They respond to the economic blows inflicted upon them by the Americans by pumping huge sums of money into their economy, thereby trying to undermine the hegemony of the US dollar. When the US threatens China with B2 bombers stationed in Hawaii, Beijing threatens the US with its nuclear-capable H-20 bombers. When the Americans pressure both allied and unaligned countries to stand against China, the latter does not hesitate to send weapons to Pakistan, ‘defend Canada’s sovereignty’, and tempt Europe with lucrative deals. And so on, and so forth. This is undoubtedly the strongest opponent the US has encountered and while it seems that the Americans still have an edge over China in the current phase of this conflict, the final outcome is anyone’s guess.
Fourth – what are we actually dealing with? I immediately commented on this issue and dubbed it the beginning of a new cold war, and as of now, I still cannot find a more suitable term than Cold War 2.0. However, this conflict is unlike anything we have seen before. There exist several fundamental differences between Cold War 2.0 and the original, US-Soviet one. Firstly, China is more powerful than the USSR ever was, even during its heyday. Secondly, there are strong economic ties between the superpowers of today while previously such countries were autarkic. Thirdly, the conflicting interests are now focused on the Western Pacific region which is crucial to the world economy and security, whereas the rivalry with the Soviets was largely focused around the global frontier. Fourth, the conflict takes place primarily at sea and not on land.
In the best analysis of the dynamics of this competition that I have had a chance to read so far, professor Øystein Tunsjø, a Norwegian geostrategy expert, emphasises the general stability and relative ‘peacefulness’ of bipolar systems in comparison to multipolar ones. He also states that due to the different geopolitical aspects of the US-China rivalry in comparison to the US-Soviet one, the risk of an outbreak of a limited conventional war is much higher with the chances of a long-lasting cold war peace being lower as a consequence. It is difficult to disagree with this. Nonetheless, since there are many more dimensions to this problem, it does truly warrant its own, separate description.
Cold War 2.0 will have a major impact on Poland as well. First, it calls into question the survival of the constructivist order established in Poland after 1989, which has benefitted the country greatly throughout the years. Regardless of the outcome of this new conflict, a significant decline in the value of international norms and multilateral bodies can already be seen, as can be an increasing number of signs indicating an imminent return to power politics. This trend should only be expected to deepen in the future.
Thirdly, considering the above, focusing on building strong relations with the US was the correct choice. However, the way in which the current Polish government has been doing it is excessively one-sided. It would be a much stronger hand to play if it was balanced through other means, e.g. a strong position in Europe or serious business ties with China
Secondly, Poland is rather poorly prepared to face this difficult situation. We have failed to make use of the last thirty years to establish a strong state, an army, an innovative economy or even as little as a few good universities. We have not created an original national strategy or even institutional and analytical instruments that would allow us to conduct effective and flexible policy on a scale suitable for a medium-sized country. Indeed, we are entering a new, big game as a player of medium size, but without any possibilities of having an actual impact on it that such a player should have. Though perhaps there is still time to make up for these shortcomings, nowadays, one’s weakness must convince him to seek external support via an appropriate system of alliances.
Thirdly, considering the above, focusing on building strong relations with the US was the correct choice. However, the way in which the current Polish government has been doing it is excessively one-sided. It would be a much stronger hand to play if it was balanced through other means, e.g. a strong position in Europe or serious business ties with China. The US is perfectly aware of the fact that it needs to put a lot of effort into persuading some of its allies to stand by its side in this conflict. In addition, the Americans have plenty of things to offer, not only in regard to security, but also economic and, more importantly, technological benefits.
The ship called ‘good relations with China’ has sailed a long time ago. Poland has spent this crucial time in slumber, letting relatively smaller players like Hungary and Czechia overtake it with ease. Nonetheless, it is still possible to rebuild the relations with other European players and it is something which certainly should be among the top priorities of the Polish foreign policy. Similarly, Poland’s special relations with Ukraine and Belarus could be an additional advantage in the case of EU’s Eastern policy, but as of today, they are not.
Fourth, from the US’s point of view, Poland’s attractiveness as an ally is primarily due to the latter being a frontline NATO member on the eastern flank of the alliance, as well a ‘whip’ to keep Russia in check. As long as the relations between Washington and Moscow remain chilly, Poland’s negotiating position is quite good. Yet, the hegemonic conflict in the Pacific also carries a great risk for Poland. As part of a policy of ‘strategic encirclement’ of China (the practically unending geostrategic obsession over the Yangtze River, deeply rooted in both the history and geopolitics of the country), which is perfectly visible in the recent years and even days, the United States may wish to strike a deal with Russia, especially due to the latter having a long border with the Middle Kingdom, strategic importance, and significant military capabilities. And be ready to pay an adequate price for such an alliance, of course. This risk is bound to increase as more and more complications arise for the US during its conflict with China. In such a worst-case scenario, Poland’s importance as an ally will be dramatically reduced and the country may also find itself in a new and significantly worse international system.
Fifth, the US-Chinese conflict may cause unpredictable economic turbulence. Therefore, increasing the resilience of both the Polish economy and the entire state should be the top priority. But this is yet another topic for a separate national debate. Thus, it is enough to state that more gold and foreign currency reserves, lower deficits and higher tax collection rate (a huge plus for the governments of Szydło, Morawiecki and Kopacz), and more allied resources to use will all contribute to increasing Poland’s resistance to any potential crises.
The peaceful times are over. We should thus ‘expect the best while preparing for the worst’. What are we doing then?
Translation financed by the National Freedom Institute – Centre for Civil Society Development from the Civil Society Organisations Development Programme for 2018-2030
Tłumaczenie sfinansowano przez Narodowy Instytut Wolności – Centrum Rozwoju Społeczeństwa Obywatelskiego ze środków Programu Rozwoju Organizacji Obywatelskich na lata 2018-2030
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