The China Dream reigns at sea

In your 2014 lecture at the University of California-Irvine you were saying that we were in the beginning of a rise of Chinese naval power. Where are we now? How much has this power developed since then?

The growth of the Chinese navy has been nothing short of remarkable over the past decade. A study published in 2016 argued that China was going to have the largest navy in the world, second only to the US by 2020. That estimate, which was pretty forward leaning at the time it was published, was overtaken by events. Now we have new estimates suggesting that China’s navy is already the largest navy in the world.

Taiwan is a critical component of the China Dream. The Dream insists that if Taiwan is not unified with the mainland, then China will never be whole and complete

Considering this – what threats to the Western world can this navy pose?

Based on the rapid rate of China’s naval production, China could have over 430 surface combatants and close to 100 submarines by 2030. There is no doubt that such a build-up would dramatically tilt the overall naval balance in China’s favour with consequences for the United States and for Asia.

What does China aim for by developing their naval – and more general – military power?

In our latest book, the second edition of “Red Star Over the Pacific,” my co-author, Jim Holmes, and I advance the argument that China’s naval modernization and maritime strategy must be understood in the context of Beijing’s grand strategy. What China aims for in the long term is, to use Xi Jinping’s slogan, the realization of “The China Dream”. The Dream has many socio-economic objectives, but there are clearly external manifestations of the China Dream, which are in turn related to Chinese sea power. These are mid-century goals that would coincide with the one hundredth anniversary of the founding the People’s Republic of China in 2049.

What are they?

Xi Jinping hopes for an emergence of a multipolar world, in which China is one pole among other poles in the international system consisting of the United States, India, the EU, and Russia. Each pole would dominate its own neighbourhood. This means that China would dominate East Asia. China would emerge as the regional hegemon. What that means implicitly is a substantial reduction of American power and influence in East Asia. To the extent that Chinese naval power helps to displace the United States in Asia, it is very much part of the China Dream.

Which areas in Asia are critical for the fulfilment of China Dream?

Taiwan is a critical component of the China Dream. The Dream insists that if Taiwan is not unified with the mainland, then China will never be whole and complete. Thus, even if China were to achieve everything else in the China Dream but it does not possess Taiwan, then the Dream is meaningless. To the extent that Chinese sea power deters Taiwanese independence and advances the cause of “unification,” then it is part of the China Dream.

You were speaking about Asia. But does China not aim for domination over the whole world?

The key here is to follow the path of previous global powers: you need to dominate your neighbourhood first, before you can truly dominate globally. The United States is the best example. It had to dominate the Western Hemisphere first before it could think and act in global terms. If China does have global ambitions, it will have to resolve many of its local problems first, which is going to take time. Taiwan is still out of China’s hands. Beijing faces a powerful regional rival in Japan, still the third largest economy in the world with a first-rate military. Local powers, Vietnam and the Philippines, are involved in territorial disputes with China. The former is a formidable regional actor in its own right. And, of course, the United States remains the primary power in the region. It is not a straightforward or easy path for China to achieve regional dominance.

Of course, the US is not interested in China Dream you were talking about, so do you think it’s precise to say that we have new Cold War between US and China, especially after the Mike Pence’s speech and so on?

Based on the rapid rate of China’s naval production, China could have over 430 surface combatants and close to 100 submarines by 2030. There is no doubt that such a buildup would dramatically tilt the overall naval balance in China’s favour with consequences for the United States and for Asia

I am agnostic about the specific terms we choose to use to describe Sino-U.S. relations today. What is interesting to observe is how much the debate has changed over the past 24 to 30 months. It wasn’t so long ago when such terms as “competition,” “trade war,” or “cold war” were not used in polite company. They verged on taboo. Now these terms are part of the lexicon. They’ve become mainstream. This change in the vocabulary paralleled a larger shift in the character of Sino-U.S. relations. Indeed, we have entered a new phase in the relationship. In the past we wanted, above all, a good, stable relationship with China. We wanted that almost at all costs. And to have a good, stable relationship, the policy of first resort was unfettered engagement across the board, ranging from economic to diplomatic to cultural and even to military engagement. Engagement was the prime directive. Prioritizing engagement meant sweeping under the rug the competitive and problematic elements of the relationship. Now there is a growing recognition about the potential risks and costs of this engagement. It turned out that engagement was akin to feeding the beast. China gorged on all the benefits of engagement even as it engaged in predatory economic behaviour, waged political warfare, pursued territorial aggrandizement, and modernized its military that threatened the United States and its neighbours. As a consequence, the United States began to undertake measures to selectively disengage from key elements of the relationship. The trade war and the debates about cutting off Western dependence on Huawei’s 5G technology are part of this decoupling process.

Is it similar to the cold war between US and USSR?

Compared to Sino-U.S. relations today, the ties between the US and the USSR were less complex, much less intertwined, and more two-dimensional. The relationship with China, by contrast, is mind-bogglingly multi-faceted with countless points of contact between the two nations. Not all points of contact, of course, are harmful or illicit. But some are clearly asymmetrically benefiting China while undercutting the U.S. position over the long term. The complexity of the relationship means that the disentanglement process is going to take many years.

There is, however, one aspect that is similar to the conflict with the USSR: the ideological dimension of the competition. We should not forget that we are still dealing with an authoritarian regime that, at its core, adheres to Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology. Moreover, it is a regime that views the world in ideological terms. The Chinese Communist Party sees the West and the values and ideas it represents, such as democracy, freedom, and human rights, as fundamentally inimical to the interests of the Party. Indeed, the Party sees Western values as a threat to its survival. In fact, the Party sees Western values and norms as ideological contaminants that could corrupt the Party and society. To be clear, this ideological competition is not an exact replica of the Cold War. China is not pursuing a messianic, global revolutionary aim that seeks to overturn the entire international system and overthrow all non-communist regimes. But, to the extent that the Chinese Communist Party seeks to preserve one-party rule and seeks to shape the external environment, which it sees as ideologically hostile, in ways that accommodates the nature of the regime in Beijing, then we are indeed in an ideological struggle. In my view, we ignore ideology at our peril.

Should Europe be concerned with the rapid development of the Chinese naval power?

The Belt and Road Initiative’s ultimate destination is Europe and its vast market. There is clearly a maritime component to the Initiative. The sea lanes that connect the Chinese market to the European market, stretching from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, is the key lifeline. As Chinese interests proliferate across these sea lanes, particularly the Indian Ocean littorals, Chinese naval power will be drawn there, far from Chinese shores, to protect those interests. The same logic applies to European waters. Indeed, the Chinese navy has already made its presence felt in the Mediterranean, the North Atlantic, and the Baltic Sea. We should expect greater Chinese naval presence along the western rimland of Eurasia.

China has employed influence operations to divide Taiwanese society. The goal is to undermine societal cohesion and confidence and ultimately disintegrate Taiwan’s will to resist from within. China seeks to win without fighting

How can US and its allies stop China from escalating its domination?

Let me use the example of the South China Sea, where the Chinese have built up and militarized massive artificial islands. China, of course, can potentially further militarise the islands. It can intimidate local rival claimants, including the Philippines. China could seize more contested features or build on features it has already taken control of, such as the Scarborough Shoal. China could declare an Air Defense Identification Zone over the South China Sea. While in-kind responses, such as freedom of navigation operations and regular presence and patrols in the South China Sea, are important and necessary, they’re insufficient. We can demonstrate our freedom to use the seas however much and however frequently we want. But those actions will not impose sufficient costs on China to keep Beijing from advancing its aims. The US and its allies must adopt a comprehensive, integrated strategy involving all instruments of national power to respond effectively to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea.

What should be a priority in such a strategy?

If China advances in the South China Sea, the United States and its allies must apply pressure elsewhere against China. They must apply counterpressure on areas that hold value to China. These include the objectives embedded in the China Dream, such as the Chinese economy, Taiwan, internal security, including Xinjiang and Tibet, and regime security. The goal is to impose meaningful costs on the Chinese Communist Party. This strategy should be designed to hit Beijing on multiple fronts simultaneously. We should think about the current U.S. strategy in this context: Washington is pushing back on the economic, military, and diplomatic fronts at the same time. This involves closer economic, political and military ties with allies and friends, to include Taiwan. On the ideological front, Washington has criticized China’s repressive policies in Xinjiang and has cracked down on China’s political warfare efforts in the United States.

There is also this idea that the United States would wage economic war against China should deterrence fail. This would include a distant maritime blockade to shut off China’s access to trade and energy resources. There is an intense debate about whether a blockade is feasible or worth the effort

What would be the overall goal of the strategy?

The goal is to make the environment less hospitable to China. For too long, China operated in a resistance-free environment. This strategy forces China to struggle on multiple fronts, many of which were quiet or uncontested for years. Beijing will need to divert more energy and resources to manage more problems and to relieve multiple pressures. The compounding costs to China over time may induce Beijing to be less aggressive and be more inclined to consider diplomacy in resolving regional disputes. The costs could also lead the regime to be more inward looking, as it worries more about keeping things together.

Do you think that US has now such an efficient strategy?

There is still a lot of work to be done. Different pieces of the strategy are being implemented across various components of the U.S. government. For the strategy to be effective, coordination among various agencies will be essential.  And some of the agencies will need to regain the institutional muscles that they had lost in the aftermath of the Cold War. At the same time, there are still many constituencies inside the bureaucracies that still cling to engagement or are programmatically biased toward engagement. The incentive structures must change to reorient institutions. That is going to take time and effort.

How to do that?

Consider one example: the United States should engage in more effective strategic communications across the various agencies. We should have a unified message as we push back against China’s various advancements and encroachments.

Should the Western choose sides – as vice-president Mike Pence said – when it comes to cooperation with USA and China?

Engagement or disengagement with China should not be viewed as a binary choice – either you cooperate unconditionally or you completely cut off ties with China. That is a false choice. What is needed is a selective engagement process and a selective disengagement process. The West’s relationship with China has reached a point where a complete cut-off is not possible or is possible but would come at tremendous cost. However, there are areas where we need to disengage selectively. The West needs to reduce its exposure and vulnerabilities in such areas as critical infrastructure and intelligence that are so vital to the security of the US and its allies. This means making tough choices. Governments will have to accept some costs or forgo some benefits, including economic and financial ones, in exchange for national security. In my view, friends and partners in the West will find that it is in their best self-interest, regardless of their relationships with the US, to be very selective and careful in how they engage China.

In the South China Sea, China could seize more contested features or build on features it has already taken control of, such as the Scarborough Shoal

What do you predict about NATO’s future in the times of the crisis of the trans-atlantic community?

Common interests and shared values bind transatlantic relations. China challenges both our collective interests and values. At the same time, only the combined diplomatic, economic, military, and ideological power of the West can rise to the China challenge.

It is worth noting that Britain and France have historically been—and still consider themselves—Indo-Pacific powers. Both have already demonstrated their resolve in maritime Asia through naval operations in the South China Sea. A French warship recently transited the Taiwan Strait. Chinese inroads in the South Pacific, including French Polynesia, are troubling.  At the same time, China’s growing influence in the South Pacific can be seen as a strategic effort to drive a salient into the US strategic position in the Western Pacific. I think there are plenty of reasons for allies to cooperate in the Indo-Pacific and in Europe’s backyard.

What direct challenge do you have in mind?

The reality is that no major conflict between China and the United States in Asia would ever be confined to Asia. The effects of such a conflict will be global in nature. Europe’s economy will not be spared, given the interconnectedness of the global economic system. Europe has a huge stake in ensuring stability and in upholding deterrence in Asia. There is much scope for greater collaboration with Europe over common interests in the Indo-Pacific.

In the first part of our interview you said that, according to some experts, the China’s navy became the biggest in the world. Does it mean that it is a match for the Americans and the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force?

The naval balance can be understood in a variety of ways. Comparing fleet size is straightforward. Qualitative measures, such as seamanship, are also important. But, there are fundamental asymmetries that favour China. The US is a global power with globe-spanning interests that must be defended. That means only a proportion of its forces is available at any given time in the Western Pacific. The rule-of-thumb, owing to maintenance and workup cycles of a global navy, is that only a third of U.S. naval forces are fully available at any given time. The reality is that a fraction of a fraction of US naval forces are on station in the Western Pacific. China, as a local power with largely local interests, can throw the full weight of its naval power and military power ashore in its own backyard.

The naval balance consists not only of the navy…

That’s right. Chinese long-range firepower on the mainland can directly influence events at sea. In addition to its navy, China’s land-based missiles and China’s shore-based fighters and bombers armed with anti-ship cruise missiles can join the fray. It is the combination of naval power and other non-naval instruments of military power that makes the Chinese threat so potent.

Isn’t the US navy more skilled and experienced than the Chinese? It has been operating for a long time, it’s been fighting in various wars, including wars in the Middle East.

True, but the US Navy has spent the last two decades fighting second- and third-tier military powers and bombing terrorist targets on land. It has been over seven decades since the US Navy fought a formidable foe in a genuine war at sea. The last major engagement was in Leyte Gulf in 1944. The last peer navy that could fire salvos of long-range anti-ship cruise missiles at the US Navy was the Soviet navy three decades ago. In terms of relevant operational skillsets, it’s not clear to me that the US Navy is any more or less prepared than Chinese navy in high-end combat.

The Heritage Foundation claims that the USA needs 400 ships to match China, some experts say that it’s 600 ships. What is the real level of US needs to press the opponent against the wall?

I would prefer not to get into a debate about how big the US Navy needs to be. What’s important is that mass matters. Quantity has a quality all its own. You can only cram in so much qualitative superiority in a single platform. If you lose that platform, you lose all that qualitative superiority in that platform. In modern sea combat against a peer navy, you need to have mass, the redundancy to absorb losses.

The Belt and Road Initiative’s ultimate destination is Europe and its vast market. There is clearly a maritime component to the Initiative. The sea lanes that connect the Chinese market to the European market, stretching from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, is the key lifeline

In the second edition of our book, “Red Star over the Pacific,” we show that the Chinese are thinking hard and concretely about future combat at sea. They envision tremendous amounts of lethal, long-range, and accurate firepower being exchanged on both sides, involving spasms of attack and counterattack. The Chinese writings anticipate very high loss rates. You could lose a fleet in an afternoon. Mass matters, because it shields you from suffering grievous losses in a single engagement. I am therefore in favour of a major naval build-up. This is going to take time. In the meantime, we need to consider creative operational concepts that enable us to make the best use of existing platforms that would give the Chinese some pause if they were ever to entertain aggression.

What are the advantages of the Chinese military equipment? Is it true that the Chinese have the best anti-ship cruise missiles in the world, or can they block the USA with it, which radically increases the potential costs of war on the part of the USA?

China has developed a large family of anti-ship missiles that can be fired from trucks on the mainland, aircraft, ships, and submarines. Many classes of those missiles possess ranges that far exceed those of the US Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-defence Force. We have been outranged. This means that US forces would have to go well inside the striking range of Chinese missiles before US forces can get close enough to strike back at Chinese forces.

It means a tactical asymmetry.

Yes. The asymmetry grew because the US Navy’s anti-surface warfare capabilities atrophied following the end of the Cold War. We recognize the challenge and have begun to reinvigorate efforts to develop our own long-range missiles and other comparable capabilities. The static snapshot of the tactical  imbalance is certainly troubling. The question is whether the United States and its allies can arrest and then reverse the erosion of our military advantages quickly enough.

Much can be heard recently about China’s development of A2AD weapons and experimental (e.g. electro-magnetic guns, hypersonic weapons).

The Chinese have long been interested in developing hypersonic weapons, which would enhance the range and speed of China’s missile forces. Technical breakthroughs and innovations are an inevitable product of any competition. We should not be surprised that China would seek technological advantages. The key is for us to stay in the game.

Is there a kinetic, conventional all-out war between US and China likely?

We should support Taiwan not just for geostrategic reasons. Taiwan’s vibrant democracy, respect for human rights, and a thriving market economy are worth defending against an authoritarian regime

I’m not completely comfortable with the term “all-out war.” A great power war, like all wars, depends on context. What is it that China and US are fighting over? What are the exact circumstances under which shots are fired that lead to crisis, escalation, and open hostilities? Perhaps another way of thinking about a possible conflict is to consider typologies. Under what circumstances would the two sides fight a limited, short war? Under what circumstances would they find themselves in a protracted war? More interesting, how might both sides, expecting an easy victory, end up in an unanticipated slugfest? Past great power wars suggest that this last scenario is quite plausible. How prepared is each side for a long war? How might a long war escalate both vertically and horizontally? These are the questions we need to address.

According to some sources, China is preparing to invade Taiwan and you also said that Xi Jinping is convinced that China is not whole without Taiwan. Do you think that such an invasion is possible in the coming 5 or 10 years? What would be the possible scenarios, and a possible reaction of US? 

A range of scenarios is conceivable. The most consequential is a Chinese Normandy-style invasion of Taiwan. An excellent study published by Ian Easton from the Project 2049 Institute makes a convincing case that China would have great difficulties pulling off an outright territorial conquest of the island. Geography, meteorology, and Taiwan’s defences all conspire against China. But, China is not standing still and will work to address their deficiencies and acquire the capabilities for this type of contingency.

Are there other options that China may have to coerce Taiwan instead of an all-out fight?

Yes. Coercive campaigns short of outright conquest could involve firepower strikes against the island, a blockade, sabotage operations, political warfare campaigns, or a combination of all these methods. These approaches, too, suffer from pitfalls and risks. For example, rather than bow to Chinese demands, these coercive acts might stiffen Taiwanese resolve and resistance. I, for one, am inclined to bet on Taiwan fighting back and refusing to be cowed.

In this scenario the Chinese diplomacy and intelligence also play a crucial role.

China has employed influence operations to divide Taiwanese society. The goal is to undermine societal cohesion and confidence and ultimately disintegrate Taiwan’s will to resist from within. China seeks to win without fighting. This suggests that the island faces a full spectrum of threats, from all-out invasion to low-level but persistent political warfare.

Are the Taiwanese prone to such an influence from China?

While the military balance has clearly shifted in China’s favour, the political dynamics in Taiwan have moved in the opposite direction. The majority of Taiwanese identify themselves as Taiwanese and not Chinese. When the Taiwanese see the Chinese Communist Party’s mass repression in Xinjiang and the systematic rollback of Hong Kong’s freedoms, they are justifiably appalled and frightened. The Taiwanese treasure their hard-won freedoms and prosperity. Nothing about one-party rule in China is appealing to Taiwanese.

It is worth noting that Britain and France have historically been—and still consider themselves—Indo-Pacific powers. Both have already demonstrated their resolve in maritime Asia through naval operations in the South China Sea

What should the US do to protect Taiwan?

Taiwan occupies a critical geostrategic location in maritime Asia. It’s the midpoint of the First Island Chain. It is the midpoint of America’s defence architecture in the region. But we should support Taiwan not just for geostrategic reasons. Taiwan’s vibrant democracy, respect for human rights, and a thriving market economy are worth defending against an authoritarian regime. Taiwan’s very existence gives the lie to the Chinese Communist Party’s claim that democracy is fundamentally incompatible with Chinese cultural norms. That is why the Party fears Taiwan. That is why unification matters so much to the Party. That is why, as I mentioned earlier, ideology matters in the large Sino-U.S. competition. The United States should therefore have a comprehensive relationship with Taiwan. And, it should not place engagement with China ahead of ties with Taiwan. This zero-sum view has been unhelpful and counterproductive.

Is there a danger of a spiralling escalation of the US-China rivalry, leading to a threat of a global economic collapse or even a nuclear war?

From a historical perspective, great powers frequently went to war with the expectations of a quick, decisive victory but they ended up finding themselves in long wars. Protracted conflicts require the mobilization of all elements and resources of national power. Such things as the sinews of economic power and the industrial base become critical to sustaining the war effort. Think about the total mobilization efforts during World War II. There is also this idea that the United States would wage economic war against China should deterrence fail. This would include a distant maritime blockade to shut off China’s access to trade and energy resources. There is an intense debate about whether a blockade is feasible or worth the effort. The bottom line is that there is no question that a great power war would have ramifications for the national economies involved and for the global economy as a whole.

If China were to achieve the China Dream, it would almost certainly involve a substantial reduction of American power and influence in East Asia and a withdrawal of US forces from the region. Should this nightmare scenario come to pass, Japan would likely be compelled to consider a whole host of options, including the pursuit of a nuclear deterrent

Nuclear escalation is also a concern. After all, we are talking about a war between great powers armed with nuclear weapons. There are fears that U.S. conventional military strikes on the Chinese homeland would be destabilizing because leaders in Beijing might mistake the incoming attacks as a disarming first strike designed to deprive China the ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons. Faced with a “use it or lose it” dilemma, Beijing might decide to launch its nuclear arsenal before its nuclear forces were decimated. But, I think it is equally plausible that Chinese leaders might absorb the first waves of attacks to determine the nature of the assault before reacting because a reflexive nuclear response would guarantee a devastating, regime-ending nuclear counterattack from the United States. The stakes are simply too high to assume unthinkingly that an attack is nuclear and thereby automatically invite nuclear Armageddon. The point is that the nuclear escalation dynamics are not preordained. We need to ask: “What would a conventional great power conflict look like under the shadow of nuclear weapons?”

You said that the important question is: “What would a conventional conflict look like in the shadow of the nuclear weapons”. What is your answer to this question?

It is possible to imagine a scenario in which a conflict is confined exclusively to the global commons. In other words, the military engagements would only take place in the air, at sea, under the oceans, in space, in cyberspace, and in the electromagnetic domain. Targets on the homelands of both sides would be spared. However, we should not assume that the United States would be deterred from conducting limited strikes against targets on the mainland. After all, China appears poised to strike US bases on allied soil, like Japan, as well as bases on US territory, like Guam. The Chinese built the DF-26 long-range missile or the “Guam killer” for precisely that purpose. We should be alert to the possibility that both sides could pursue less restrained strategies owing to escalatory interactions with each other, the stakes involved, the proximate causes that sparked the conflict, and so forth.

China has developed a large family of anti-ship missiles that can be fired from trucks on the mainland, aircraft, ships, and submarines. Many classes of those missiles possess ranges that far exceed those of the US Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-defence Force. We have been outranged

What is the role of Japan?  Japan is treated as a country with a nuclear weapon “in the basement” – it seems you can produce several nuclear warheads in three months. In the face of what China and North Korea are doing, there is much talk about the possibility of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons. How do you assess the idea and perspectives of Japan going nuclear?

I think the notion that Japan is only a screw-turn away from having nuclear weapons is overly simplistic. While Japan possesses the technologies and fissile materials, going nuclear is more than a technical affair.  There are many barriers in the way.  The nuclear taboo remains a powerful norm in Japan. The decision to go nuclear would be politically costly. Going nuclear is more than building the bomb. You need an entire infrastructure to support nuclear weapons, including delivery systems, command and control arrangements, sensors, security protocols and mechanisms, doctrine, strategy, civilian control of weapons, exercises and training, and procedures for nuclear use. Going nuclear is dauntingly complex and expensive.

What could make Japan go nuclear in the first place?

The short answer is Japan’s confidence in US security commitments, in particular, American extended deterrence. To date, there is very little evidence that Japanese leaders believe their trust in America’s nuclear umbrella and U.S. conventional military deterrence is misplaced. What might change Japan’s calculus? If China were to achieve the China Dream, it would almost certainly involve a substantial reduction of American power and influence in East Asia and a withdrawal of US forces from the region. Should this nightmare scenario come to pass, Japan would likely be compelled to consider a whole host of options, including the ultimate weapon. Such a dire set of circumstances and the prospects that Japan would have to live with the Chinese hegemon could push Japan to think the unthinkable.

Are there other ways Japan can go about to obtain a greater security and to uphold deterrence against China?

Japan is modernizing its forces to better adapt to a more sever security environment. It is beginning to garrison forces on the Southwest Islands—the string of islands stretching from Kyushu to Taiwan. By militarizing the island chain, Japan hopes to erect a barrier offshore opposite the Chinese coastline. The operational aim is to better monitor Chinese military activities in the East China Sea and to contest Chinese use of the seas and airspace should deterrence fail. This posture would severely complicate Chinese war plans should fighting break out and, in doing so, deter Beijing from the rolling the iron dice in the first place.

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