Poland to become a nuclear-weapon state?

Tekst dostępny jest również w języku polskim

Thanks to a great work of Jan Sadkiewicz and the Universitas Publishing House, your book, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”, has been finally translated into Polish. What is ‘the tragedy of great power politics’?

My basic argument is that because of the structure and architecture of the international system, the states – and we’re talking mainly about great powers here – have no choice but to try to gain power taking advantage of other great powers. And what exactly do I mean when I say “the structure of the international system” is what causes this kind of aggressive behavior. We live in a world where there’s no higher authority that sits above states, and because you can never know the intentions of other states, it’s very important for the great powers to do everything they can. To be as powerful as possible.

The states – and we’re talking mainly about great powers here – have no choice but to try to gain power taking advantage of other great powers

Why is that the case? Because if you get into trouble, there’s no higher authority that can come down and rescue you. And furthermore, if you’re a great power, and I’m a great power, I can never know what your intentions would be in the future. And you can never know what my intentions would be in the future. And there’s always the danger that you will have malign or evil intentions towards me, or I will have malign or evil intentions towards you. And if one of us has malign intentions and goes after the other, again, there’s no higher authority that we can turn to. So the best way for you to protect yourself is to be much more powerful than me because then I really can’t threaten you. The best way for me to protect myself against you, well, as a state in this story, is for me to be much more powerful than you. What happens then is that you and I, two different states, compete with each other for power. One wants to be more powerful than the other, and this is the basic logic that drives international politics. It’s the notion that the best way to survive, the best way to be secure in international politics, in a world where there’s no higher authority – is to be really powerful.

And Poland is a good example of how this basic logic works. Poland’s big problem over the past few centuries is that it was too small. It didn’t have a big population, it didn’t have a lot of wealth. It was surrounded by countries like Germany and Russia and Austria that were much more powerful, and those countries gobbled up Poland. Poland disappeared from the map from 1795 to 1918 – as you know better than I do – because it was small and weak. Poland would have been much better off if it had been really powerful. Poland would have been much better off if it had been by far the most powerful state in Europe. Again, this shows you very clearly that the best way to survive is to be really powerful. What you want to do is to look like the United States in the Western hemisphere. No Americans go to bed at night worrying about Canada or Brazil, or Mexico attacking the United States. Why is that the case? It is because we are so big and so powerful. That is the best way to survive.

As to the relationship between power and security in the case of Poland, you were also one of the famous critics of the NATO enlargement. Why? It was of existential importance for us in Poland.

I thought that when the Cold War ended, it was very important not to antagonize the Soviet Union, and then, after 1991 – not to antagonize Russia. It was quite clear to me that Russia, the principle remnant state leftover from the Soviet Union, was going to be nowhere near as powerful as the Soviet Union was, and was not a threat to the West the way the Soviet Union was. So it made good sense for the United States not to provoke Russia and not to end up in a security competition with it. Most people don’t realize this, but when the Cold War ended, the Soviet Union wanted the United States to stay in Europe, and the Soviet Union wanted NATO to remain intact.

The best way to survive is to be really powerful

It’s very important to understand it. You want to ask yourself the question why, and the answer is: the Soviets saw the American presence and NATO as a way of keeping the Germans down. Soviets understood that once they left Eastern Europe, once the Warsaw Pact disintegrated, you would have German unification. And not surprisingly, the Soviets worried about what the implications of German unification would be, given the history of the 20th century, World War I, World War II. So they wanted the Americans to stay, but what the Soviets did not want was NATO’s expansion.

They did not want this military alliance at its birth. It had been a mortal foe of the Soviet Union moving up to the Soviet Union’s borders, and of course, later – Russia’s borders. Not long after this, the Cold War ends and the Soviet Union collapses. In the mid-1990s the Clinton administration announces that NATO is going to move eastward. And we effectively adopt an open door policy, which says that virtually every country in Eastern Europe, including countries that are right on Russia’s borders, are welcome to join NATO and welcome to join the European Union, and, effectively, to become part of the West. Which means that these countries will become Western bulwarks right on Russia’s borders. This is what NATO expansion was ultimately going to lead to. From a realist’s point of view, this is a prescription for disaster, because no great power is going to allow a military alliance, one led by another great power, to march right up to its borders.

Most people don’t realize this, but when the Cold War ended, the Soviet Union wanted the United States to stay in Europe, and the Soviet Union wanted NATO to remain intact

The United States got away with expansion in 1999. Of course, Poland was brought in, and then we got away with another tranche of expansion in 2004. But the real trouble started after April 2008’s NATO Bucharest summit, where it was said afterwards that both Georgia and Ukraine would be part of NATO. The Russians said at the time that it was categorically unacceptable. And it’s no surprise that in August of 2008 a war broke out, involving Georgia and Russia, and then in February 2014 a major crisis broke out over Ukraine. The Russians are not going to allow Georgia or Ukraine to become part of NATO or to become, more generally, Western bulwarks on their border. So I believe that NATO’s expansion has ultimately led to a crisis in the West.

Let us be clear about that NATO enlargement in the 1990s. Are you claiming that NATO’s expansion to the Central-Eastern Europe was a mistake?

We were able to get away with NATO expansion in 1999 and we were able to get away with expansion in 2004. Inviting Ukraine and Georgia in 2008, when we began to move to push the expansion of 2004 – that was the fundamental mistake. That was a bridge too far. I was not in favour of any NATO expansion at all, to include the 1999 and 2004 expansion. And that’s in large part because I did not view Russia as a serious threat.

This is consistent with the book by one of our collaborators, dr. Michał Lubina, entitled ‘The Bear in the Shadow of the Dragon’. He claims that China is neocolonizing Russia, making it a resource base and a transit country. So Russia is quietly becoming a vassal and neocolony of  China. What’s your view on that?

I think that’s too strong. However, the theme of that book captures the fact that China is a rising great power and Russia is a declining great power. And furthermore, they are neighbors. They historically had antagonistic relations. They almost went to war in 1969 and the Russians will tell you behind closed doors that they worry greatly about growing Chinese influence in central Asia and in Siberia. And it makes the Russians very nervous to see China turn into a military colossus. And I think Russians will tell you that the United States is a natural ally of Russia in the face of Chinese expansion. So I think there is some truth in the pieces you’ve described to me, but I don’t think Russia is on the verge of becoming a vassal state. I think that’s too strong, but you should understand that if China becomes so powerful, and it threatens Russia in that kind of way, the Russians will have powerful incentives to ally with the United States, and United States will have powerful incentives to ally with Russia.

We were able to get away with NATO expansion in 1999 and we were able to get away with expansion in 2004. Inviting Ukraine and Georgia in 2008, when we began to move to push the expansion of 2004 – that was the fundamental mistake. That was a bridge too far

By the way, the rise of China, up to a point, is good for Poland, because as China continues to rise and the Russians continue to worry about China, the Russians can’t interfere in Eastern Europe in major ways. The real problem for Poland is that if China gets really powerful, the United States will pull its troops out of Europe to contain China in East Asia. From Poland’s point of view, the most important foreign policy goal must be to keep NATO intact, which is another way of saying: “Keep the Americans in Europe”. The number one far policy goal for Poland should be to keep American military forces physically located in Europe to keep NATO intact. A principle threat to that goal is the rise of China, because if China becomes successful and it will be really powerful, the United States will has to work overtime to contain it. There’ll be a powerful temptation to pull the US forces out of Europe.

Are you advising us to stop the inevitable?

What’s inevitable?

The rise of China and American withdrawal.

It’s not clear that China is going to continue to rise in a truly impressive way. United States is going to go to great lengths to try to prevent that, and there are structural problems inherent in China that they may slow down its economic growth. So it’s not obvious to China to become so powerful that the United States has to leave Europe.

Let’s get back to it later. Poland is in an increasingly uncertain and dangerous position. It has thus to redefine her national interest. To keep America in is a clear goal, but it may prove impossible to achieve. Your great predecessor, prof. Kenneth Waltz, claimed that the best guarantee of security is to have nuclear weapons. And, by the way, best way to establish international peace is to proliferate nukes. So, should Poland become a nuclear power?

I think that Poland’s principle goal should be to keep the Americans in Europe and to keep NATO intact. What would that mean is that the American nuclear umbrella is over Poland’s head. That provides a wonderful deterrence for Poland. I think if the United States would pull out of Europe and the Poles were on their own, and had to provide their own security, there would be very powerful forces pushing Poland to get the nuclear weapons. It’s not politically correct to say that these days. Most European, including most Poles, would scoff at the argument that Poland should have nuclear capabilities. It’s unthinkable, because the Americans are there and Poland doesn’t have to worry about nuclear deterrence, because the Americans provide their deterrence for Poland.

If China becomes so powerful, and it threatens Russia in that kind of way, the Russians will have powerful incentives to ally with the United States, and United States will have powerful incentives to ally with Russia

But given Poland’s history, given Poland’s geographical location, and given the fact that Russia’s not far away and it has thousands of nuclear weapons, I believe an incentive for Poland to get nuclear weapons should be regarded. A lot of people act as if any country getting nuclear weapons is remarkably foolish and irresponsible, but this makes no sense. The United States has nuclear weapons. And even though it’s an incredibly secure country and at the conventional level it’s the most powerful country in the world, we have thousands of nuclear weapons and we have no interest in giving them up because we understand that they’re the ultimate deterrent. Israel, India, Pakistan, France, Britain, China, Russia: do you see any evidence that they’re giving up their nuclear weapons?

No.

Why? Because they understand they are the ultimate deterrent. Well, if Poland is in a situation where it no longer has the American nuclear umbrella over its head, don’t you think that Poles will think long and hard about getting nuclear weapons? I think the answer to that is ‘yes’. I made this argument about Germany in the Cold War. If the United States were to leave Europe, the Germans would think about getting nuclear weapons. Most people said: ‘that’s ridiculous’. And they now say: ‘Oh, Germany didn’t get nuclear weapons’. And I say: No, but it’s because the American didn’t leave, the Americans kept the nuclear umbrella over Germany. This is why the Soviets first, and then the Russians wanted NATO to remain intact. It’s why they wanted the Americans to stay in Europe. They wanted an American nuclear umbrella over Germany, not Germany developing their own nuclear weapons!

The Americans would oppose Poland getting the nuclear weapons. We oppose everybody getting them. An ideal world from the American point of view is one in which only a single country has nuclear weapons

In a world where Poland is on its own – e.g. if it was 1920 and you were thinking about Polish policy and developing nuclear weapons was an option, you would have to build up your weapons like that. Poland would’ve been much better off if nuclear weapons were available in 1920. You know, I wrote an article in 1993, saying Ukraine should not give up its nuclear weapons. The Russians wouldn’t be in Eastern Ukraine, if Ukraine had nuclear weapons. The Germans and the Soviets would not invade Poland if it had nuclear weapons.

It’s a clear advice about what we should do.

I’m just being very clear. My argument is that what you should do is work to keep the Americans in Europe, so their nuclear umbrella is over your head. I’m not advocating that Poland should now get nuclear weapons. As long as you have the American nuclear umbrella over your head, nothing can threaten you. But once you lose the American nuclear umbrella, I think it’s quite clear that Poland should think seriously about going down that road.

I’m going to be clear: it’s not in America’s national interest, but it’s imposed in Polish national interest. I won’t emphasize that to audiences, but I’ve said it on numerous occasions: if I was an Iranian national security advisor, Iran would now have nuclear weapons. It would’ve gotten nuclear weapons a long time ago. The United States and Israel would not be threatening Iran today. However, I want to make it equivocally clear that from America’s point of view, it’s not good for Iran to have nuclear weapons. We have vast interests in Iran.

And the same goes with Poland. The Americans would oppose Poland getting the nuclear weapons. We oppose everybody getting them. An ideal world from the American point of view is one in which only a single country has nuclear weapons.

The United States of America.

Yes (laughter). But for Poland’s point of view, without the American nuclear guarantee, if I was a Polish national security advisor, just like the Iranian one, I would tell you the same.

Americans are not threatening to attack North Korea. We treat North Korea very differently than we treat Iran. That’s good for Korea because it has nuclear weapons. It’s the ultimate deterrent. That’s why the Americans aren’t giving their weapons away. And that’s why the Israelis aren’t giving them away. It is a gamechanger. It doesn’t mean you don’t have to worry about your survival at all. You have to be very careful. You shouldn’t get in a war where those things get used. I’m fully aware of that, but as a deterrent it works. It just works, because the nuclear weapons are so awful. That mean if you have weapons and I have weapons, there’s a threat that we’re going to get into scenarios where we’re vaporized, where we disappear from the planet. We are cautious, right?

Yes. That’s the most powerful factor of national security. And an extremely strong incentive for international peace and cooperation too.  So we have a conclusion. Thank you for the talk.