A new Yalta deal. Brace for a strategic nightmare

The Polish version was published: 14.10.2013

“No illusions, gentlemen!” Emperor Alexander II’s message to the Polish nation once again becomes relevant due to the fact that our geopolitical environment is radically changing, and not in our favour. These terrible changes include Washington’s strategic pivot towards the Pacific caused by the rise of China (accelerating the decline of NATO), the America-Russia reset and energy partnership, as well as the progressing decay of the European Union, coupled with the ascendancy of Germany, which is strengthening its relationship with Russia.

If the above processes continue (and they most likely will), the international order will undergo drastic changes. This may result in a new Yalta-type deal for Poland and the former Soviet bloc – a pessimistic, though very real, prospect. The ambitions of these countries will be subordinated to the interests of those who shape the world order, in addition to shifting alliances, which would deprive Poland of any support from global powers.

If the above processes continue (and they most likely will), the international order will undergo drastic changes. This may result in a new Yalta-type deal for Poland and the former Soviet bloc – a pessimistic, though very real, prospect

Thus, after more than twenty years, the geopolitical pause that was beneficial to Poland is over[1], even though many analysts thought that the ironclad rules of geopolitics had been circumvented and would never make a return. This illusion was rooted in the spectacular supremacy of the U.S. and the economic powerhouse that was Western Europe working together as part of the European Union. Ever since Germany, and Prussia before it, became stronger than Poland, we had very little geopolitical wiggle room due to being located between it and Russia, both stronger than us. After 1989, Poland failed to seize the opportunity to change the balance of power in Central and East Europe and neutralise the threat of Germany and America strengthening their partnerships with Russia based on their real interests.

Though that opportunity was squandered, it still is not too late to build Polish subjectivity. However, today’s situation is worse due to the fact that a truly effective politics must be prepared to deal with all possible scenarios – including a sudden advent of a post-NATO and post-EU era. Let us analyse – however briefly – the impact of the key international actors on the geopolitical status of Poland, and think about what we can potentially do in the emerging balance of power.

The Chinese pressure and changing U.S. priorities

Over the course of the last several years, the American leaders have rearranged their strategic goals, resulting in a new international order which is disadvantageous to Poland as it sees the U.S. and Russia become allies.

This is due to the fact that, in the 21st century, China emerged as a powerful competitor, spurring the United States to make a foreign policy pivot in the autumn of 2011. The new defence strategy[2] announced in 2012 shifted America’s the focus to the West Pacific in order to face the challenge posed by China[3]. After 2008, the Chinese leadership began to undermine the American hegemony in South-East Asia, a region that is of extreme importance to the global economy[4], both militarily by expanding its naval potential and questioning the U.S. ability to project force in the West Pacific area, and by way of careful application of diplomatic and economic measures. The latter is based on undermining the faith in the weakening dollar as the transaction and reserve currency of choice by alarming the world about the Americans printing money to save their economy (quantitative easing). As regards the military aspect, American analysts believe that the potential of the Chinese navy and rocket forces (Second Artillery Corps)[5] would guarantee a quick victory against the U.S. in a conventional conflict centred around the first island chain (Ryukyu, Taiwan, Luson, the Philippines)[6], effectively preventing the Americans from projecting force in those areas. This raises justified concerns among the U.S. allies in the region[7]. Being pushed out from South-East Asia and losing control over its maritime routes would spell the end of the global hegemony of the U.S.

The Americans perceive as their greatest threats the economic influence of China on its region and the possibility of the dollar being replaced as the global reserve and transaction currency

The Americans perceive as their greatest threats the economic influence of China on its region and the possibility of the dollar being replaced as the global reserve and transaction currency. This is why a new doctrine was developed, followed by the diplomatic rush that occurred between 2011 and 2012. The latter was supposed to convince America’s partners in Asia that the U.S. is still strong and is able to guarantee security in the region, which is threatened by the Chinese pressure, and also to remind them that there exists an alternative to the Chinese order the form of the trans-Pacific trade zone protected by America. The result of this pivot is the retreat from Central and East Europe, for example. The 2009 missile shield situation and the Russian reset were the first signs of things to come. In January 2012, Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta announced that two of four U.S. Army brigades would be withdrawn from Europe and dissolved, in addition to calling on the continent to take responsibility for its military security. The actions of the Obama Administration signalled (to Poland as well) that the current state of affairs in Europe, including the coming changes to the balance of power, did not threaten the global supremacy of the U.S., which is why America did not want to expend its resources to counteract these changes. This policy was based on the premise that regional actors should be left to their own devices, so that every regional system could perpetuate itself on its own, allowing the weakening America to channel its energy towards more serious challenges. It appears that the crisis-stricken superpower accepts the rise of Germany in Europe and the strengthening of political, economic and military ties between Berlin and Moscow, believing they pose no threat to the U.S. at this stage and also give America more wiggle room in the case of a potential confrontation with China, in which Russia in particular will have a key role to play.

It is the Chinese challenge that was the main reason for the Russian reset promoted by the American elites. Beijing is considered a rival by Washington, and the weakening superpower gathers its strength to face the pretender. Whatever form the crisis assumes, be it economic, consisting of tariffs protecting the American industry and forcing China to appreciate the yuan, or military, it will be necessary to acquire Russia as an ally against the Middle Kingdom. The Americans also know that China needs access to resources to continue its rapid development. Therefore, allying with Russia would stifle China’s development, which is also in line with the official American policy of curtailing Chinese influence adopted in January 2012.

On the other hand, China growing in power at Russia’s doorstep could limit Russia’s westward expansion, and the strategic interest in Poland announced several months ago by China could serve to increase our international potential. It should however be noted that, even though being a strategic partner of China in Europe can be an asset (especially in the short term), it could result in Poland being called Beijing’s Trojan horse should the rivalry between it and the West escalate.

The rise of Russia

Even though Russia is still plagued by its perennial weaknesses[8] which prevent it from becoming an economic powerhouse, ever since Vladimir Putin came to power, our eastern neighbour has been able to stabilise its internal affairs, strengthen the state and, primarily with use of energy resources, pursue an effective foreign policy aimed at rebuilding its sphere of influence.

Understanding Russian history and reasons for Russian expansion have always been the topic of various analysis and theories. It appears that only the classical geopolitical approach is viable in practice, whereby the main reason why Moscow has been imperialistic in its policy is geography. Russia is a land superpower[9] whose sphere of influence has no natural borders in the west and the south, which is why it ceaselessly tries to “correct” them or create dependent “buffer zones”. This logic is universal and applies to all large states which possess the resources necessary to expand, and manifests in the political or economic subordination of one’s neighbours. Economic factors further contribute to this, as large entities with large markets and a supply of capital and manpower, possessing energy resources and a powerful military (as is the case with Russia), find it easier to subordinate weaker neighbours.

China growing in power at Russia’s doorstep could limit Russia’s westward expansion, and the strategic interest in Poland announced several months ago by China could serve to increase our international potential

The Russian imperialism is therefore not a result of the ideology of the ruling elites or its political system, but is a perennial feature of the country which has been cultivated for centuries. Russia will always expand westward as long as it is in a position to do so, and its efforts will only be thwarted by the resistance put up by the countries which stand in its way, as well as by the involvement of external superpowers, which may, but do not have to, be interested in stopping or balancing it. This objective nature is best exemplified by the history of territorial and economic expansion of the United States, which is a natural consequence of its geopolitics.

What does this mean for Poland? Our geography means that we will always be threatened by Russian expansionism and it will always remain our primary concern in terms of security. Thus, it is necessary to constantly fight against Russian ambitions, and the Polish elites should realise this and be ready for confrontations[10]. The nascent strategic partnership between Russia and the U.S. can seriously threaten Polish independence, and is certain to make it more difficult to thwart Russian expansionist efforts if it results in the Americans withdrawing their protection.

The ambiguous role of Germany

While the threat of our eastern neighbour is the largest of our geopolitical problems, the partnership between Russia and Germany, based on permanent, mutual interests, will always be a strategic nightmare if Poland is weaker than both of these countries.

The potential of post-unification Germany was limited by the decision-making mechanisms of the EU and the belief of the German elites that its strategic interests were best pursued via the European Community. But when the German leadership realised that its interests are thwarted to a large degree by the dominance of America, and that a strategic partnership with Putin’s reborn Russia could bring significant economic and political benefits, Germany began to gradually extricate itself from the current geopolitical order to have more space for pursuing its own policy. This manifested in the form of the Nordstream pipeline, being opposed to the missile shield and promoting Russian interests in the EU. At the same time, Germany’s position in the Community was greatly strengthened thanks to the wise economic policy of the German government, which looked after the local industry and finances, as well as due to the crisis in the Eurozone, of which Germany is the ultimate guarantor. This allowed Germany to freely decide how the EU should develop, and if the Eurozone is shaken by another crisis, the EU will virtually become property of Berlin. Paradoxically enough, this would be both good and bad a far as the strategic interests of Poland are concerned. While Germany would acquire even more power over other countries, the power it would receive over the Community would come at the cost of ensuring its continued existence, which is more beneficial than when Germany pursues a completely independent policy (e.g. in its relations with Russia) without having to take into account the tangle of interests of EU member states and institutions or EU regulations.

It should be noted that Germany never ceases to calculate if the EU is still profitable. This is why, from the perspective of Polish security, Germany is a pivotal country. Its strength and romance with Russia are a threat to us even now. Should the EU dissolve, the alliance between Russia and Germany would be greatly strengthened.

The European Union on the decline

The European project is based on two fundamental principles which were well-received by EU residents: The Community was to guarantee prosperity – without having to sacrifices. Approving of these principles, the elites of more and more nation-states sacrificed parts of their sovereignty. The financial and Eurozone crises proved both of these principles false. The European Union no longer guarantees prosperity, and some members were forced to make sacrifices to save the common currency and maintain the economic stability of other Eurozone countries. The European solidarity was put to its first test. It was also determined who makes the decisions regarding what to sacrifice, who has to make the sacrifices and who will supervise the entire process. Germany became the decision maker and supervisor, as it is Germany that is the guarantor of the EU’s existence, of the prosperity the European community still expects. This position naturally meant that the Germans would be the ones in power. However, considering the pace at which the crisis is progressing, this power may soon become arbitrary, and that is not something the countries entering the EU and the Eurozone agreed to. This tension will be very difficult to manage, and may even spell the doom of the Community.

From the perspective of Polish security, Germany is a pivotal country. Its strength and romance with Russia are a threat to us even now. Should the EU dissolve, the alliance between Russia and Germany would be greatly strengthened

The day Germany starts to believe that the EU no longer adequately serves its interests will be the day it will cease to exist, even if treaties will still be in force, lucrative positions will be awarded, and its institutions will continue to function. It is in Poland’s best interest that the EU continues in its current form, which partially supports Polish modernisation projects on the one hand, and restricts German foreign policy on the other. Thus, the role of Poland is to support all EU reforms which ensure its continued existence and serve to restrict Germany, but without potentially leading to the establishment of an EU superstate with a universal fiscal policy and single decision-making centre which governs the peripheries.

Germany has an increasingly dominant position in the decaying EU, and would stand to directly benefit from an alliance with Russia, as the German economy requires the Russian energy resources and the Russians need the technologies which Berlin has in abundance. This offers great potential for synergy, which is the basis of all long-lasting alliances. The German demographic problems may be alleviated using cheap and skilled Russian labour, performing work in Russia. Berlin and Moscow have no conflicting geopolitical interests, hence the German stake in modernising the Russian army.

Intermarium

In response to the changes occurring in the geopolitical situation, it is possible for Poland to strengthen its position by jointly establishing a security community with all the countries in Central, Eastern and Northern Europe which are threatened by Russian expansionism. These countries, if they want to continue to develop independently, should enter into a regional partnership. The goal of this partnership would be to hinder Russia’s ambitions and make its expansion more costly. This would require that we are ready to bear the costs of the confrontation. This policy would not have to directly conflict with the grand project of the Western elites (and, until recently, of parts of the American elite), which involves Russia becoming an economic and resource-supplying partner and devising a strategy of stopping China. As an ally of the West, Moscow would have to take into account the interests of Warsaw if Poland were strong and valuable enough for the Western countries, in addition to being the leader of the Intermarium[11]. This eastern policy would require a modern, effective army, which, on the one hand, would be able to defend the territory of Poland and deter the aggressor, and also be able to defend the interests of Poland east of its borders if necessary. Poland must strive to become an actor with more power in Central Europe than Russia, which would make us a partner whose resources could be useful for the U.S. to achieve its goals. No longer would we struggle with the eternal Polish dilemma of having to choose between Russia and Germany, as it would be Germany and the U.S. that would be faced with a choice between Russia and Poland.

Between Germany and Russia

The strategic withdrawal of the U.S. from the region, the need of America to ally with Russia to stop China and the increasingly close ties between Berlin and Moscow are a sign that a New Yalta is coming. Situated between Germany and Russia, the Polish leadership must make strategic choices, taking into account a multitude of factors influencing the future, including the possibility that the world order may soon change drastically. It is very likely that the United States will soon be unable or unwilling to guarantee our security, and that the interests of individual Euro-Atlantic community members, which formed the base for NATO and the EU, will start to diverge. Russia may play a new role based on its mutual interests with the United States (related to China) and Germany (economic and military partnership), which would enable it to more effectively pursue its natural policy of subordinating states situated along the axis of its geopolitical expansion.

The delusion of the “end of history” will soon cease to exist completely. Nothing is currently more important for the Polish elites than to prepare for the worst, including a new Yalta deal.

Tekst dostępny jest również w wersji polskiej

The translation was financed by the National Freedom Institute – Centre for Civil Society Development from the funds of The Civil Society Organisations Development Programme 2018-2030

Tłumaczenie sfinansowano przez Narodowy Instytut Wolności – Centrum Rozwoju Społeczeństwa Obywatelskiego ze środków Programu Rozwoju Organizacji Obywatelskich na lata 2018-2030

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[1] The previous geopolitical pause for Poland lasted several years after the First World War.

[2] U.S. Department of Defense: Sustaining US Globar Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington DC. Department of Defense 2012, pp. 1-5), retreved from: www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf.

[3] China is a much stronger competitor than any state which has ever tried to undermine the hegemony of the U.S. due to its economic power; enormous, disciplined and power-hungry society and other traits which predestine it for geopolitical greatness, the only exception being, at least for now, its maritime potential.

[4] Over the last decade, Asia and the West Pacific region have become the pivotal region for global commerce and a hub for maritime transport and trade routes, in addition to becoming the world’s population centre; every state in the region numbers tens or hundreds of millions of citizens, not to mention China and India; the region is where the economic interests of the globalised world converge, and according to various data, between approx. 20 and 40% of all global trade volume is transported across the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca, in addition to 90% of all oil imported by China, Japan and South Korea.

[5] It should be noted that China has the strategic upper hand in the region due to its strategic depth, the ability to operate along the internal lines of the theatre of war, as well as due to its superior missile arsenal as the only country in the world to be in possession of short and medium-range ballistic missiles and missiles able to strike moving US Navy aircraft carrier battle groups. The Americans lack offensive weapons boasting such range and precision, in addition to being forced to strike at targets located within the huge landmass of China. The Chinese armed forces could instead shower all American bases and ships with rockets, destroying them in the first few days of a potential conflict.

[6] American analysts believe that it is currently impossible to effectively defend Taiwan and South Korea, and that defending Japan would be extremely difficult.

[7] This is why the West Pacific Air-Sea Battle Concept was developed and has been the basis of America’s new war doctrine since January 2012.

[8] Its main problems are related to infrastructure, being unable to properly manage its enormous landmass, and that, as a non-maritime nation, it cannot offset this with maritime trade and transport. Its enormous size coupled with a lack of infrastructure means that it can only be governed with help of a strong state structure utilising force or the threat of its use, which in turn stifles the development of a middle class and prevents the country’s economy from being competitive.

[9] All currently usable Russian sea and ocean ports are accessible via narrow straits controlled by other states; the situation may soon change as the new Northeast Passage is developing in the Arctic due to climate change, which remains ice-free year-round, is completely under Russian control and is located in large part within the Russian territorial waters; this passage offers a shortcut from Europe to Asia.

[10] A confrontation does not have to mean war. There is a great deal of political space between war and a conflict of geopolitical interests leading to a geopolitical confrontation. An example of this is the Polish-Russian confrontation concerning the geopolitical position of Ukraine during the Orange Revolution, the confrontation between several Intermarium states and Russia during the Russo-Georgian War, which took the form of the Tbilisi visit, or the Russian reaction to our purchase of the Możejki refinery and the Russian embargo on Polish meat products imposed several years ago.

[11] On the topic of new possibilities for Polish politics in Central and Eastern Europe, see T. Szatkowski, Czy powrót do Międzymorza?, „Rzeczy Wspólne” 2011, Vol. 3(5)