Will a concert of powers prevent a third world war?

The Polish version was published: 5.11.2014

Motto: “All nations want peace, but they want a peace that suits them.” – Admiral Jacky Fisher, founder of the modern Royal Navy, before the outbreak of World War I

The United States and China are the richest and most powerful countries on Earth. Their economies and interests are intertwined to a very large degree, and both of those states have enormous influence on the global economy, of which they are the most important constituents. However, China is becoming richer and more powerful, which begets the question: what comes next? How will this affect the rest of the world? Will China and the U.S. become enemies, or will they be able to work together?

Rising tensions

Unfortunately, history shows that competition for economic hegemony always becomes a strategic rivalry, which in turn very often leads to a war for dominance. The only way to avoid a dangerous and escalating rivalry is probably for the rising power (China) to curb some of its ambitions, and for the weakening power (USA) to make enough room for the pretender in the existing system. This flexible approach to the rise of China and its role in the world would require a completely new architecture of security and partnership in Asia. This new order, if it is to reflect the changing balance of power and have a chance of survival, must resemble a concert of powers, which is something that occurred in Europe post-1815. The term was coined by famous (though unknown in Poland) Australian political scientist and strategist Hugh White in his book The China Choice.

This scenario is a distant prospect, however, as the Americans, still confident in their abilities, refuse to share their power over the global institutions and mechanisms ensuring their supremacy in Asia and the West Pacific area. Actually, you would be hard-pressed to find a single American who believes they should give China anything, or who could even imagine the U.S. stepping aside to make room for the pretender. The Chinese, on the other hand, would rather wait until they become stronger than the U.S. and are able to change the existing order with a single blow (best case scenario – without an always-risky war) to make it more advantageous to China and its interests.

The choice America is faced with is most likely the most difficult one in its history as a superpower. The current situation is unprecedented

The largest proponents of a concert of powers are medium and small-sized Asian countries and Australia, which are now between rock and a hard place and are terrified by the prospect of being taken hostage in the course of a hegemonic rivalry between China and America. Such a rivalry, were it to intensify, would have a devastating impact on the economic development of the region, and, more importantly, would force the countries of Asia and the Pacific to choose between China and the U.S. The choice would be fraught with uncertainty and involve the enormous risk of siding with the loser.

Time is running out

Very few people understand that this is a choice the Americans have to make now, as the Chinese may soon become too strong. Washington has three options to choose from. America can give up on its supremacy in Asia, or it can try to preserve the status quo and remain the dominant power there. Alternatively, it can create a new order based on the concert of powers concept, ceding some ground to China.

Unfortunately, very few U.S. analysts and strategists even consider the first option. The second option is supported by virtually everybody else, with nobody opting for the third alternative. Meanwhile, the rivalry with China is intensifying, and neither side trusts the other in security and economy-related matters, forcing both powers into a trap of trying to gain an advantage and exploit the other rival’s weaknesses. The Americans are making a pivot towards Asia, implementing a classic strategy of stopping and encircling China. Their armed forces are implementing an air-sea battle concept that is targeted at China and its asymmetrical warfare capabilities. The Chinese armed forces, on the other hand, are implementing the “string of pearls” concept, which involves expanding their sphere of influence to coastal islands, successfully testing the guarantees of security given by America to the countries in the South China Sea region. In addition, China uses Russia in its balancing act against the U.S., at least in terms of its energy policy, demonstrating that it is not in fact impacted by a maritime blockade, something that America, in control of the maritime transport routes to and from China, would like to be the case.

Realistically speaking, nether the U.S. nor China will become strong enough to assert dominance over the entire region within the next few decades. Any such attempts by one of these states would bring chaos, impact the economy and drastically increase the risk of a war for hegemony breaking out. It is urgent to devise a plan of preventing the worst case scenario from happening. A good solution thus appears to be a new Asian order based on the proven concert of powers concept.

The choice America is faced with is most likely the most difficult one in its history as a superpower. The current situation is unprecedented. Since the 1880s, the U.S. has enjoyed the highest national income in the world. None of its 20th-century competitors, such as Germany, Japan or the USSR, could compete with it economically. According to the International Monetary Fund, China has already become the world’s largest economy, overtaking the U.S. in terms of purchasing power parity (data from October 2014). In the mid-21st century, it is likely that the Chinese economy will be twice as large as that of the U.S. This will not be a result of a more-or-less probable fall of the United States, but the objective and, it would appear uninterrupted, rise of China. It would this be a relative decline of America as a superpower compared to the growth of Chinese power and wealth.

The problem is that America, busy with its war on terror which began in 2001, missed the moment where China became too important for global trade to be punitively isolated from the global economy. Now, it is too late for that

Course set for rivalry

After the Mao-Nixon meeting of 1972, China, faced with the prospect of Soviet domination, accepted American supremacy in Asia. In return, it was given the opportunity to rapidly develop its economy with help of a wave of capital investments and access to the global (including American) market. It now appears that the Chinese want to alter this model, as its form and the utility it offers is no longer sufficient. From Beijing’s perspective, American interests in the region are terribly restrictive, limiting further development. In addition, America refuses to acknowledge China as a superpower, without whose consent nothing can be done in Asia.

The Chinese perspective is as follows: from the geopolitical point of view, the U.S., disregarding Chinese interests, is actually following what is an equivalent to the old Monroe Doctrine in the West Pacific. That doctrine involved opposing European influence in 19th-century America. Today, it involves preserving the hegemony of America in Asia, with no regard for the rapidly increasing significance of China. The American policy on China in the last 20 years was based on hedging: China accepted the political and economic dominance of the U.S. and the system of trade rules imposed by Washington, and in return was able to trade with the rest of the world without restrictions. The Americans believed that they were in control of the system by way of ensuring access to global markets – after all, China needs to be able to trade in peace in order to develop. The problem is that America, busy with its war on terror which began in 2001, missed the moment where China became too important for global trade to be punitively isolated from the global economy. Now, it is too late for that. This mistake was only noticed in Washington during the 2008-2009 financial crisis.

The crisis reshaped the way the American leadership perceived its future relationship with China and the now-famous pivot towards the Pacific was announced. Spectacular diplomatic efforts were made to convince the countries located in the region that America was still strong and could guarantee the security and prosperity enjoyed by Asia thanks to the American supremacy of 1972 and onwards. The climax of the strategic pivot towards the Pacific was the determined and confrontational speech given by the U.S. president in the Australian Parliament in Canberra (November 2011), which Asian pundits termed the Obama doctrine. The message was clear: America’s full might now protects the status quo in Asia, and will resort to anything to protect it, as the U.S. considers the current order to be the best one possible. Later, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would soften this message to assuage the fears of the Asian countries which would be affected by a U.S.-Chinese conflict, mentioning the special relationship which must be established by the two countries. Special in this case refers to the fact that no such relation had ever existed between two naturally competing superpowers.

What does China want?

China has little chance to achieve complete hegemony over Asia and the Pacific. There are simply too many strong countries present in the region which would oppose it, not only the United States. Other such countries include Japan, the third-largest economy in the world, the ascendant India, as well as Russia, which is weak economically, but has a strong military and a nuclear arsenal, in addition to a large number of medium-sized countries which influence the political order in Asia, including South Korea, Vietnam and Indonesia. The goal of China is to gradually implement its own version of the Monroe Doctrine in Asia and the West Pacific, pushing the U.S. out of the region just like the Americans pushed the Brits out of the western hemisphere all those years ago. The doctrine is reminiscent of the old, familiar tributary system based on Chinese economic dominance and supremacy. China’s increasing dominance over the world’s manufacturing hub will give it economic power, which will translate into global domination.

The Chinese, pushed back by America and other countries, are also faced with a dilemma. China is currently too weak for a power grab, but also too strong to accept American supremacy at the cost of its own development and interests. A destabilising conflict of interests occurs, which hinders the achievement of China’s primary goal – economic development, which could gradually lead to Chinese domination. Understanding of this tense relationship is necessary to appreciate the need to establish a concert of powers in Asia.

The logic behind a concert of powers

It is important to understand the risk to the entire world posed by the intensifying rivalry between China and America. The status quo is untenable, and attempts by the U.S. to preserve it at all costs could lead to war, first signs of which can already be observed in Asia. Handing over Asia and the West Pacific area to China may have unpredictable consequences for the rest of the world, and may impact the entire network of international relations and trade established several hundred years ago during the era of great geographical discoveries made by Europeans. All other scenarios thus appear even worse than a concert of powers.

At the same time, the concert itself is difficult to envision, not to mention arrange, implement and maintain. It would not even be considered if the other solutions were not even less feasible. Last but not least, it is impossible to force Washington or Beijing to participate in it – both superpowers would have to agree voluntarily.

The goal of China is to gradually implement its own version of the Monroe Doctrine in Asia and the West Pacific, pushing the U.S. out of the region just like the Americans pushed the Brits out of the western hemisphere all those years ago

In 1815, Europe was exhausted and in ruins as a result of the Napoleonic Wars, a classic example of a war for hegemony over the continent. Five powers (Great Britain, France, Prussia, Austria and Russia) met in Vienna to negotiate a new post-war order in Europe, the goal being to minimise the risk of a great war breaking out between them. The resulting order survived until 1914. And whatever the belief may be in Poland, the 19th century, from Vienna to Sarajevo, was a “Century of Europe” – a century of demographic development, prosperity, power and colonial expansion. The powers performing in the concert could compete, but only as long as they did not deprive the others of their status as a power in the system. The rivalry thus moved to colonies and the peripheries of Europe (the matter of the declining Ottomans).

Similarly, an Asian concert would surely compete for influence and resources in Africa and the Near East. The post-Vienna order can still be felt in Europe. While wars did erupt in the Old World in the 19th century, none of them became a contintent-spanning battle for hegemony. This was because the Congress of Vienna introduced a rule according to which none of the powers could attempt to dominate the others, and if it would, then all the remaining powers would unite against it. Naturally, small and medium-sized countries did not get to participate in that deal. The criterion was, and still is, power. The amount of power required was enough to threaten the independence of other powers. Thus, the concert only involved the truly powerful states. As is the case with every system, it had its flaws, but it prevented a great war from erupting, as opposed to what happened in the 20th century.

The cornerstone of a concert of powers is the belief that attempting to achieve hegemony on one’s own is less beneficial than keeping the concert going. It is important to distinguish a concert of powers from the balance of power which existed in Europe after the Thirty Years’ War. A concert requires an express or implied agreement between powers. When a balance of power exists, the powers do not communicate, but the system itself renders spontaneous hegemonic attempts difficult. Others form alliances out of fear, frequently pre-emptively as well, making the system very unstable and vulnerable to calculation errors regarding one’s own potential and the power and intentions of others.

It appears that there are seven requirements for a successful concert of powers in Asia: first, every power participating in the concert acknowledges the internal legitimacy of the other powers; second, every power acknowledges that every one has legitimate interests, which must be negotiated, and that there is no dominant entity that “knows better” than others; every participant has the right to develop its own military and defend its interests, but armed forces capable of threatening the entire system and gaining control over it are unacceptable; a concert of powers is thus not a disarmament pact, but military domination over all other participants dismantles the concert; moreover, procedures and rules must be established on how the powers should conduct themselves to avoid asserting dominance; an implied agreement is also required regarding unanimous opposition to being dominated by a single entity; in addition, the societies and nations of the concert powers must accept the mental and axiological limitations resulting from the concert, which appears to pose a challenge to both American and Chinese culture; Finally, as regards prestige and status, the powers participating in a concert must treat one another as equals.

This list clearly shows why concerts of powers are rare in the history of humanity.

Invites are handed out according to the following rule: system participants do not need to be equally powerful. However, the weakest member must be strong enough to oppose the actions of the concert if it were left out or its needs were not represented and met by the concert’s arrangements. The strongest member, on the other hand, must not be strong enough to dominate the rest – else it is not limited by other members of the concert. In order for a concert to last, all countries in the region which meet these criteria must be invited.

Who to invite, who to skip

The countries invited to an Asian concert would be the U.S., China, Japan and India. Japan is an obvious choice to join the power-hungry China and America: it is the third-largest economy in the world, as well as being a maritime trading state possessing enormous technological and organisational potential, whose geographical location enables it to control maritime routes to East Asia, the Pacific and the U.S. Japan’s participation as a power in an Asian concert would require an enormous mental and military transformation. At the same time, the concert would be impossible without Japan.

An interesting paradox occurs in the case of the Land of the Rising Sun. Without a strong alliance with it, the U.S. cannot maintain supremacy in Asia. Without subjugating Japan, China cannot achieve hegemony in the region. The country is thus trapped: the more it is afraid of China, the more it depends on the U.S. The paradox is, the stronger China becomes, the less Japan can rely on the States, as China becomes too valuable and threatening to the vital interests of America, which may lead to the U.S. sacrificing Japanese interests if necessary. This results in a situation which is untenable for Japan in the long term: depending for security on the rivalry between its two most important economic and international partners. An escalation of the American-Chinese rivalry would be a disaster for Japan. Equally disadvantageous, even disastrous, would be close cooperation and strategic friendship between the two powers. The only solution for Japan would be to stop depending on the United States in terms of security and military capability, which would include the acquisition of nuclear weapons. This would end Japan’s alliance with the U.S., which would only seemingly be disadvantageous.

After all, the rise of China sees Japan become an ever greater burden to the U.S., involving America in Japan-China disputes and making it more difficult to find common ground with China without having to take into account the interests of Japan. Thus, a close alliance between the U.S. and Japan makes a concert of powers in Asia impossible. That is, of course, unless the Americans want to preserve their supremacy at all costs – in that case, a strong alliance with Japan is indispensable. Theoretically speaking, Japan itself seems to have no other options. Should it remain a client state of the U.S., it will be trapped in the strategic dilemma described above. It can also easily find itself at a disadvantage if the political pendulum swings back towards being dependent on China. Some analysts doubt if Japan is mentally able to perform a large-scale transformation and redefine its place in the world. But without Japan, there can be no concert of powers. In any case, as long as Japan remains a client state of the U.S., America is too strong for China to agree to a concert of powers in Asia. The situation would be completely reversed were Japan to ally with China. The conclusion is thus: a concert of powers can be established and maintained if Japan becomes more independent of the U.S.

India is growing economically and demographically, but is still significantly weaker than the remaining three powers of the potential concert. India’s influence over the Indian Ocean cannot be overstated, however, as it will become the trade and resource highway of the world, as well as the access route to Africa and the Near East for the Asian powers in the 21st century. This is why India should become a participant.

The status quo is untenable, and attempts by the U.S. to preserve it at all costs could lead to war, first signs of which can already be observed in Asia

Russia, even though it would love to play a role in Asia, would be excluded from the concert, as its presence there is simply too weak and the country does not meet the criteria mentioned above. However, it is true that current Russian efforts to change the entire international order, focused on Ukraine, are aimed at establishing a concert of powers including Russia not only in Europe, but in Asia as well. Still, Russia being excluded from the Asian concert would have absolutely no impact on its functioning or existence. While Russia does appear to be a potential partner capable of helping the U.S. in its fight against China, its exact role is difficult to predict. First, we do not know how strong it will be – its territory is obviously vast, as are its resources and educated society, despite its demographic problems. The Russian economy, however, is weak, shallow and very vulnerable to resource market shifts, preventing the country from becoming an Asian power in the next several decades. Its growing weakness in relations with China and the length of the Russian-Chinese border will make the Kremlin think twice before adopting a pro-American policy. In the short term, it is certain that Russia is only a strong medium-sized state in Asia. The same applies to the other candidates: South Korea, Vietnam and Indonesia.

The greatest challenge

The current situation and choice America is faced with is an important test for the elites in Washington. Presenting the matter in this way calls into question their perception of the global situation, which is additionally reinforced by the relatively recent supremacy of the U.S. after the Cold War. The Americans will have to rethink their attachment to Bretton Woods II, the Washington Consensus, IMF and the World Bank, as well as their role in Asia and the global economy, in addition to economic liberalism, democracy and the western interpretation of human rights. They will have to reconsider whether they still are a “city on a hill” and whether they actually have an exceptional role to play. Fundamental questions will have to be asked regarding the U.S. military and its ability to project force in relation to the forces of other powers. These are questions asked not by the undisputed, dominant superpower, but by one of many, even if it still is the strongest one in the system. America will be forced to carefully select the interests it cannot abandon, and be ready to negotiate others which have hitherto been protected and considered completely legitimate. This is a very difficult path to follow for a superpower which dominated the economy before World war I without having to participate in a concert of powers or a game between various players in the system.

This exercise will be useful even if no concert of powers in Asia is formally established, and China is able to gain concessions and redefine its status at the expense of America on its own (or, as Kissinger put it, thanks to the “invisible hand”). Lack of reflection and adaptation can transform the coming strategic confrontation into a new Cold war, this time between America and China, which in turn can easily become a hot war. It is important to remember that China is much more powerful in relation to its potential enemies than Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union.

Finding the right solution to this problem will be the greatest global challenge of the coming years.

The translation was financed by the National Freedom Institute – Centre for Civil Society Development from the funds of The Civil Society Organisations Development Programme 2018-2030

Tłumaczenie sfinansowano przez Narodowy Instytut Wolności – Centrum Rozwoju Społeczeństwa Obywatelskiego ze środków Programu Rozwoju Organizacji Obywatelskich na lata 2018-2030