Germany’s conservative attitude towards reforms in the eurozone arises out of the weakening of the federal government after the 2017 elections and prolonged coalition negotiations. Chancellor Merkel has a much weaker political position than before, which is also true of parties which form the government and which have a smaller backing among the electorate, made even worse by ever stronger Euro-sceptical views of the populace. In addition, the minimalistic attitude to the EMU reforms is receiving support from the Nordic and Benelux countries which, like Germany, are backing the idea of strengthened fiscal austerity policies* instead of far-reaching institutional changes, especially the creation of new transfer instruments in the monetary union^[21].

France and her allies from southern Europe would expect more far-reaching changes, but they are aware of opposition from Germany, the Nordic and Benelux states  

France and her allies from southern Europe found themselves on the defensive in March of 2018 when it came to reforms in the eurozone. Even though they would have expected further changes than the ones described above, they were aware of resistance from the German side, the Nordic and the Benelux states. This is why they abandoned some of their ideas, including the introduction of a separate finance minister and budgets for the eurozone^[22]. The proposals which were left on the negotiating table seem rather unambitious, but even they are not guaranteed to be introduced any time soon (this is especially true of changes to the banking union).