In this way, the eurozone does not appear to be well prepared for another crisis. On the other hand, the “last chance saloon” – the policy of quantitive easing by the ECB –has already been mightily over-extended during the most recent crisis. The bank purchased state and private institution bonds from the eurozone to the tune of 2.3bn euro, and the ability to purchase further bonds based on current facilities is running out. What is more, one of the rather probable candidates to take over from Mario Draghim in 2019 is the president of the central German bank Jens Weidmann, known for his criticism of quantitive easing as delivered by Draghi. Even if Weidemann turns out to be too controversial an appointment for some European states in the south, German politicians will probably push for such a personal appointment within the ECB, which will guarantee the reversal of current policies served up by this Bank in terms of quantitative easing and low interest rates^[23]. This puts the ECB’s ability to intervene in the case of another crisis in serious doubt.

At the same time, economists are predicting a gradual strengthening of the euro in the coming months, which could weaken economic growth in the eurozone^[24]. Then again, the victory of euro-sceptic parties in the Italian elections of 2018, the likelihood of the formation of an Italian government which would be unwilling to consider budgetary savings and structural reforms, and is even considering the introduction of a national currency to sit alongside the euro^[25] – could once again destabilise the situation in the eurozone. This is all the more true seeing as – as admitted by the European commission itself – the Italian economy at the start of 2018 was the one most at risk across the whole of the EU^[26]. All of this should not encourage Poles to hurry in their application to join the EMU.