The main argument for proponents of Poland to quickly join the eurozone is, most of all, geopolitical. This approach surpasses all potential risks and economic dilemmas.* The geopolitical benefits to the state in relation to membership of the EMU depend above all on a closer connection between Poland and the West, and especially Western Europe and the core of the European Union. We are here talking about including Poland in the heart of the union, especially in light of the worrying idea of divisions within the Union along the lines of a “two-speed Europe”*, resulting in ever-stronger bonds between existing members of the eurozone, while other members of the EU suffer increased risk of political marginalisation. Finally, this is to be a specific sort of protection against the rising geopolitical tension between the West and Russia. Such motives for joining the eurozone was a decision made by the Baltic states which, still in the time of crisis within the eurozone, adopted the European currency. It was to bind these countries more tightly, in a geopolitical sense, with the West and make it harder for Russia to interfere with the former Soviet Union states.

In relation to this argumentation, we have to keep in mind that the EMU is not a defence arrangement. The basic responsibility for the defence of European states from any possible aggression from Russia is down to NATO. Even the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) within the EU doesn’t guarantee this sort of protection. Th European Union has neither the necessary potential nor infrastructure, as well as being unable to (in the foreseeable future) replace NATO in terms of helping member states honour their mutual allied commitments, similar to those which came out of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

We must also take into account that we are experiencing some serious geopolitical changes around the world. What we are observing includes an increasingly assertive stance by Russia in relation to NATO and the West, as well as more and more divergent policies between the USA and some EU states, along with intense statements from many prominent politicians in Western Europe encouraging an easing of the conflict with Russia and lifting of the sanctions imposed as punishment for its actions in Ukraine. In some way, this undermines the veracity of allied commitments in many Western European states should we experience a worsening of the crisis in relations with Russia, both in terms of NATO as well as – even more so – in the EU. This also weakens the argument which suggests that entering the monetary union increases the chance of protection from the risk of open conflict between any given state and Russia.  

Taking into consideration the increasing divergence between, on the one hand, France and Germany and – on the other – the USA, the point about becoming closer to the West is not all that accurate. The West has entered a period of increasing divisions, which could deepen in the coming years. Both the USA and the UK are certain to move away from continental Europe and especially away from leaders championing European integration, by which we mean the French-German tandem. These are the very causes why Paris and Berlin have exerted pressure concerning progress with the  CSDP, understood as a search for a shared autonomy with regards to NATO and the US. It is also worth noting that Brexit made this accelerated integration process possible, seeing as the UK for many years has resisted this sort of approach to the defensive stance within the EU. Remaining outside the eurozone will probably help maintain, or even deepen, the close relations between Poland and the US/UK. Meanwhile, entering the eurozone would mean being more closely tied to the centre of European integration, shaped more and more by the strategic interests of both Germany and France.

Remaining outside the eurozone will probably help maintain, or even deepen, the close relations between Poland and the US/UK

In this way, I am now approaching the question of a “two-tier Europe” divergence of integration. The aforementioned process is slowly increasing as more and more reforms are introduced into the eurozone. Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that the most far-reaching changes, which could deepen the phenomenon of a “two-tier Europe”, will certainly not be introduced in the coming years. I am thinking of a separate budget, parliament or finance minister for the EMU. German policies are, by and large, responsible for this, seeing as for a long time they have now been trying to resist the process of segmentation within the EU. In spite of this, the monetary union takes on geopolitical meaning in terms of integration processes, and countries choosing to remain outside the EMU can be increasingly marginalised, especially following Brexit. And yet, entering the eurozone doesn’t automatically guarantee a stronger political position in Europe, while maybe paradoxically weakening it somewhat.

Getting closer to the centre of the EU doesn’t necessarily mean an increase in influence when it comes to political decisions being made in the EU or in the eurozone. There are many countries within this sphere which, as a result of decrease in their geopolitical potential, lost their earlier influence in the strategic decisions concerning European integration. This includes Italy, which has – for many years now – had a radically reduced influence on EU policies, which also includes the key decisions regarding the EMU. As commented upon by one of the observers of the relations within the monetary union, Italy has for years only been of interest to France and Germany when dangerous turbulences within the country threaten the stability of the euro^[31]. It turns out that the basis for geopolitical influence of any country in Europe is largely dependent on its economic potential^[32]. This can be seen in the example of Germany, a country which is an economic powerhouse, even though its military might is decreased. It doesn’t have any nuclear weapons, nor any serious army resources, nor is it a permanent member of the UN Security Council. In spite of all that, it continues to play the leading role in current integration processes within Europe. Membership of the eurozone can therefore increase economic benefits, and at the same time geopolitical influence in the region and globally, or else quite the opposite – it can have economic and social impacts which are negative, and at the same time cause a depreciation of the geopolitical potential of a given country.

In order to enter the EMU, Poland should have a healthy economy, one which is far more structurally ready for such membership than, say, that of Italy

This means that calculating the economic questions of joining the monetary union is of  primary concern not only in the light of potential economic benefits or costs. It also has direct geopolitical consequences. The weaker members of the monetary union are not only losing influence on the international scene, they are also more and more dependent on aid from stronger members of the union. They are thus becoming less and less autonomous with regards to the political centre of the EMU in many – non-economic – senses regarding European and global politics.

In order to enter the EMU, Poland should have a healthy economy, one which is far more structurally ready for such membership than, say, that of Italy. Otherwise the monetary union will quickly become a mechanism for economic and political dependency between Poland and the more competitive states within Wester Europe. Holding back on the decision to join the EMU will make it possible to protect Poland from economic risks, which could easily turn geopolitical. During the most recent crisis, Poland remained a “green isle” of resilience within Europe, and currently – even though it remains outside the EMU – is one of the most attractive countries for international investment^[33]. Therefore, remaining outside the eurozone for now creates more opportunities for creating a competitive economy, both in the domestic market of the EU, as well as external markets. Hence, it is a chance for Poland to advance geopolitically, though nothing can guarantee successful outcomes. This depends on many other factors, including government strategies related to Poland’s development and a robust strategy for creating an innovative and competitive national economy.