Although civil servants*, politicians and experts from the eurozone are discussing a series of reforms, they are thus far being introduced very slowly and in rather limited ways. The most important question regarding the fixed mechanism of macroeconomic balancing of the eurozone is not even being discussed among politicians. This might include systemic financial transfers from countries with a trade surplus to those who have a deficit in their current trading accounts*. This is an idea which was proposed far back by John Maynard Keynes as part of the idea of establishing an International Monetary Order^[18]. Everything suggests that policies intended to reduce the risk of further crisis for the EMU will involve savings and austerity*, not economic growth and improved competitiveness among the weaker countries. There is no agreement about reducing the social costs related to the crisis with the aid of European funds, such as EU social transfers*. This means that the least competitive and the most indebted states will have to struggle alone with social costs arising out of further austerity policies.*

The reforms planned currently include a humble investment fund* for the eurozone, as part of a future long-term financial perspective for the whole of the EU. The level of this fund* in terms of initial proposals is set around 25 billion euro. This is not a sufficient investment mechanism to encourage structural reforms or reduce potential outcomes of economic downturns*. This is mainly because of German politicians who are not keen on a separate EMU budget, nor on any sort of investment provision* for weaker economies within the monetary union. These sorts of investment funds, much like stabilising loans within the EMU, are first and foremost meant to have a mobilising effect in terms of introducing policies of saving* and internal structural reforms.

This dispute also relates to whether stabilising loans issued by the EMU are automatically supposed to involve compulsory losses for private investors involved in bonds of the country which receives support from the Fund

There are also plans to change the “shopfront”* of the EFSF for the EMU, and yet only with a minor increase of powers given to this institution (such as restructuring debts). A heated dispute around these structural transformation relates mostly to secondary issues, as seen from the perspective of the whole system: for example the question of whether the EMU is meant to be covered by EU laws and be under the influence of the European Commission. This also relates to whether stabilising loans issued by the EMU are automatically supposed to involve compulsory losses for private investors involved in bonds of the country which receives support from the Fund (in the way that Greek debt was restructured with private creditors in 2012). Germany is demanding this, with opposition from the likes of the French and Italians.  This could limit the interest investors have in bonds issued by the weakest states or those most vulnerable to further crises. It also deviates radically from the French idea of unifying debts in the EMU, something Berlin has been opposed to for some time now. A key function of the EMF is to be, in the opinion of German politicians, the stabilisation of the monetary union in case of crisis and introducing structural reforms and fiscal consolidation in problem countries.

Another reform relates to the completion of the creation of the banking union. This is especially true of introduction of European guarantees on deposits. Until now, the Germans have been opposed to this, but now they are basing their agreement to this reform on the obligation to first increase banking reserves and eliminate the problem of an excessive number of risky loans in the banking sector^[19]. These exceed 750 billion euros in the same monetary union, and solving this problem might take many years. The ECB has toned down its position regarding this problem, including agreement to consider ways of safeguarding banks in conversations with specific institutions, instead of introducing identical rules for the whole sector. In addition, the ECB has agreed that banks can introduce appropriate financial reserves which neutralise the threatened debts* only after a three year interim wait. According to specialists, the Bank is putting back the solution of this problem, something which is generally inconvenient for the stabilisation of the eurozone^[20]. It might also strengthen the resolve of German politicians regarding further reforms in the banking union.