Reforms in the eurozone have their short and long term perspectives. The former is defined by the Brexit timelines, elections to the European Parliament and then the new team within the European Commission in 2019. This means we have about a year in which changes will be introduced, which at present are the subject of difficult negotiations.

Not many politicians are in the mood to campaign for far-reaching reforms, mainly because the economic situation in the EMU has improved. At the same time, a few countries which have a lot of say in the decisions mentioned here have experienced a worsening of internal political climates, which has reduced their potential for compromise. This is especially true of Germany, and the profoundly weakened position of chancellor Merkel along with her coalition team. These are the reasons why the reforms which could be agreed upon by 2019 will only encompass the establishment of the EMF (with competencies similar to the current EFSF), a reduced investment line* for the eurozone in the subsequent EU Multiannual Financial Framework and a change of the banking union.

A certain solution leading to the reduction of macroeconomic differences would be to introduce communitarian debt* within the eurozone. And yet German politicians are avidly against this

All these actions will not fully reduce the eurozone dysfunctionality, especially in terms of deficits in investment and pro-growth policies. The EMF will not for now be financially ready to support any large member states threatened with insolvency, such as Italy. There is no certainty in securing the banking sector and it will probably depend still on the monetary policies of the ECB, as well as support for endangered banks from the budgets of member states. In the case of further turbulences within the global financial systems, this runs the risk of another rapid rise in public debt within the eurozone, which is currently much larger than before the most recent crisis. There is currently no discussion between member states about social financial transfers* which could stabilise shocks relating to political mood or crises. Nor is there any negotiation covering redistribution instruments which minimise macroeconomic imbalances between individual members of the EMU. The existing tools for monitoring the macroeconomic situation in individual countries included in the European Semester, which shift responsibility for these adjustments to individual states, do not solve the problem of structural asymmetry within the monetary union*.

A solution to the reduction of macroeconomic differences could be the introduction of communitarian debt in the eurozone*, especially with the intention of diverting resources towards investments which increase competitiveness in the weakest states. And yet, German politicians are adamantly against this, while experts and economists from Germany blame the ECB for taking steps which actually have the same effect as the introduction of communitarian debt^[29].*