The NATO crisis and Poland between greatness and annihilation

The Polish version was published: 2.8.2016

We have already got used to catastrophic visions of the future of the European Union. We are relatively unperturbed by them because we have NATO – a guarantee of “hard” security. Compared to the belief that we have the world’s strongest army on our side, the sense of economic and political uncertainty is secondary. But what if the North Atlantic Alliance is about to experience a similar crisis to that plaguing the EU? Recent events in America and Turkey are making this possibility increasingly more likely.

Paradigm shift?

I think everyone now accepts the possibility of Donald Trump winning the election. The fact that the comments of the liberal elite regarding Trump’s provocative statements are usually limited to lamenting about his “populism” and “irresponsibility”, or to scaremongering about a Third World War which the Republican candidate is supposed to cause is mostly proof that they have lost touch with reality. If we want to understand reality, we cannot ignore the fact that this potential leader of a democratic superpower is not simply letting everybody in on his internal monologues, but is actually saying what millions of Americans, including various interest groups, want to hear.

Trump is correct: The North Atlantic Alliance is obsolete

In July, Trump openly questioned the idea of NATO in its current form, which was consistent with his previous statements on the issue. He called it “obsolete”, questioning the key section of the Washington Treaty, Article 5, by saying that American help would be limited to those countries which make the contributions required of them, most importantly those who spend 2 percent of their GDP on defence. He clearly questioned whether the Baltic states should receive help (Lithuania and Latvia are currently not contributing their required share).

What is the meaning of these statements? On the one hand, it is no wonder that the overburdened empire wants to restore bilaterality to its alliances: most NATO members fail to meet the 2% requirement, at the same time expecting the American military to protect them. Washington has been stressing this for years, and Trump’s words should thus be treated as an announcement of the rule being enforced more strictly.

On the other hand, something is about to break down. If the solidaristic model (“all for one and one for all) is replaced by a transaction-based one (“I will help you if you help me”), then we open the floodgates of uncertainty. After all, today’s 2% may not be enough tomorrow if the situation becomes more heated. Why not 4 or 5 percent? What about countries which are particularly vulnerable – should they contribute as much as regular members of the Alliance? After all, ensuring the security of Poland is more expensive than that of Canada. What about those whose defence may have to involve a nuclear strike, in contrast to those states where such a scenario is purely theoretical? The costs skyrocket.

We can complain about Trump’s radicalism and national egoism, but we have to keep in mind that the American drift in the direction he personifies is nothing new. The Republican candidate does not only speak on his own behalf.

An obsolete alliance

The same applies to his statement about NATO being obsolete, which is can be considered the central thought category of the tendency discussed here. Unfortunately, Trump is correct: The North Atlantic Alliance is obsolete. First, it was established to defend the West from the Soviet Union, which no longer exists. Its successor, Russia, is a pale shadow of the communist superpower. It would be impossible for it to rise to a comparable level within 20 years and threaten the American hegemony. Also, the U.S. (and Western Europe) needs Russia, just like before 1917, as a “sanctioned empire” which stabilises the vast areas of Eurasia it occupies, as well as the Near East and Central Asia. Last but not least – Russia would be a very valuable ally against China. The Russians know this, of course, and want to position themselves as best they can before the inevitable escalation and conflict for global supremacy occur. From this perspective, the bloodshed in Georgia and Ukraine was but a scuffle to determine the exact scope of the sanction – Politics is not for dreamers.

The bloodshed in Georgia and Ukraine was but a scuffle to determine the exact scope of the sanction – politics is not for dreamers

Secondly, the main threat to the United States today is China, a superpower which is stronger, wealthier and more sophisticated than the USSR (and all previous rivals as well). The two giants are battling on two main fronts: the West Pacific and South-East Asia, as well as Eurasia. NATO is irrelevant to the former, and as regards the latter – the gargantuan New Silk Road project cuts across the Alliance, offering the majority of its members an attractive economic alternative to what the U.S. can provide. From the point of view of Europe, which has been concerned with the rapid concentration of global resources around the Pacific, the Road is an opportunity to remain relevant as an important global trade hub. From the perspective of the United States, its main allies working together with its arch-enemy only serves to further question whether it should invest in NATO. If Washington fails to act, the Alliance will become a paper tiger or cease to exist.

That is not to say that the Americans do not want the Alliance to continue. It offers them enormous influence over its members, as well as the Near East and Africa, in addition to helping keep Russia in check. The problem is that the United States is suffering from an increasingly bad case of imperial overstretch: challenges arise faster than they can be overcome, the budget is at its limits, the citizens are becoming frustrated, and the allies do not want or are unable to share the burden. Thus, pressure is rising to make difficult decisions and give up on more and more priorities.

In light of the above, Trump’s comments about NATO come as no surprise. The overabundance of eristics aside, he openly identifies the growing issues related to preserving America’s vital interests. It does not matter that he does this tactlessly, radically and abruptly. He speaks with the voice of an angry people which went unheard for years. Trump is the effect, not the cause. What is surprising is the unproductive hysteria of the majority of pundits and the lack of alternatives proposed by countries which will be most profoundly affected by the wave of changes on which Trump is surfing.

The greatest ally rebels

In the meantime, the situation is becoming more dire. The failed coup in Turkey gave the regime headed by Erdoğan an excuse to do two things: to purge its ranks and turn against America. The former is beyond the scope of this article, so let us discuss the latter.

Ankara decides whether the European migrant crisis is exacerbated, which could result in total chaos

Turkey is not a rank-and-file ally of the West. It is a key hub in a network of American and European alliances and interests. Its land forces are the largest in NATO (second-largest in the world), being the largest army in the Near East, the country’s location between continents and seas is of strategic importance, and the Turkish economy is rapidly growing. Turkey actively participates in NATO operations, including those against the Islamic State. Without being able to transport troops across its territory and use the NATO bases located there, the campaign against ISIS would have been incredibly more difficult and costly. The time the Islamists would have gained had the Alliance had to organise alternative transport routes would have given them much greater opportunities to expand. The current main refugee and migrant route goes through Turkey from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, leading all the way to Europe. More than 3 million migrant and refugees are currently in the homeland of Atatürk, with potentially 6 million more to come from the war-torn countries located east of Iran. Ankara decides whether the European migrant crisis is exacerbated, which could result in total chaos.

This key ally is now rebelling, causing concern and disorientation in the West. Government forces combating the rebels blocked a vital NATO base in Incirlik, from which attacks had been launched against ISIS and which is most likely where the majority of the NATO nuclear arsenal is located (around 50 B-61 hydrogen bombs). This both surprised and humiliated the Americans, as well as the Germans, whose delegation was denied access to the base, which also housed German personnel.

But that was only a taste of things to come. The Turkish media, followed by leading politicians, began to accuse the United States of supporting the coup with its intelligence, as well as financially and politically. It appears to have been a planned propaganda campaign. Turkey demanded the extradition of Fethullah Gülen, an immigrant living in Pennsylvania, accusing him of organising the coup and long-time penetration of the Turkish army and bureaucracy. When the Americans responded with a request for proof of his guilt, Erdoğan publicly questioned the proportionality of the alliance and repeated his statement: “if we are strategic, model partners, do what is necessary”. No other ally of America had ever addressed Washington in that way (my thanks go to Dr Jacek Bartosiak drawing my attention to this aspect of the recent events in Turkey).

What game is Erdoğan playing?

The disorientation and puzzlement of the western elites with this state of affairs have achieved bizzarre levels. When the coup began, John Kerry warned Turkey that undemocratic actions could result in it being expelled from NATO. Angela Merkel threatened to block Turkey’s accession to the EU after Erdoğan announced he would bring back the death penalty. It is difficult to fault them on formal grounds: the politicians simply adhered to the membership criteria of both organisations.

Politically speaking, however, the situation is absurd. It was Brussels and Berlin that had been blocking Turkey’s EU aspirations for years, eventually forcing it to abandon the goal. Wagging a finger at a country which rules over the demographic security of the European Union is a sign that its leaders are very much out of touch with reality.

Similar applies to NATO membership: The Alliance needs Turkey more than Turkey needs the Alliance. Erdoğan’s country can handle itself – a “Turexit” would not only be a reputational failure for NATO, but would also mean losing the largest land army and strategic transport routes. The south-eastern flank would thus be moved to Greece, Bulgaria and Romania – countries which are small, very weak and difficult to defend. One needs only to look at the problems caused by ISIS to realise how much we want Turkey to remain in NATO.

What game is Erdoğan playing? It appears that he feels strong enough (and likely also sees the weakness of the West) to permanently pivot eastward, make Turkey a more flexible country, or redefine its relations as an ally at a higher level. The Turkish government has been expressing its dissatisfaction for some time, complaining about being treated as a “second-class ally” by America. It is common knowledge that the government in Ankara does not take kindly to the American plans of arming the Kurds against ISIS and its criticism of Turkey’s internal affairs.

A weakening NATO and a new era

It is difficult to predict today which of these options Erdoğan will choose, and if he will be able to endure should America strike back. One thing is certain though – we are witnessing one of the largest, if not the largest, internal crisis NATO has ever faced. There is also the prospect of the Alliance, and the West in general, growing significantly and permanently weaker: were a “Turexit” to actually happen, and, more importantly, because of the wave of copycats which would be spurred by Erdoğan’s actions to abandon their alliance with the USA.

NATO is thus growing weaker as we speak, suffering from conflicting interests and its current form being questioned by both its leader (USA) and key vassal (Turkey). The excitement surrounding the recent summit in Warsaw is thus akin to being satisfied with leftovers from yesterday’s dinner. The modest and token – as soberly summed up by Aleksandra Rybińska – allied troop movements after the summit have become even more insignificant within the context of the recent events. In these curious times, counting on external guarantees of security is just as reasonable as it was back in 1939.

For Poland, the “One Belt, One Road” project is not only an opportunity to strengthen relations with the Chinese superpower

State – army – diplomacy

What should we do then? The triad of state, army and diplomacy is what Poland should be focusing on, as “Nowa Konfederacja” and the Centre for Analyses of the Jagiellonian Club have already suggested to the government of Beata Szydło.

Firstly, the current “loose federation of ministries” should be converted into a real government able to quickly plan, implement, coordinate and evaluate actually ambitious, interministerial endeavours. From the perspective of anti-Polish factors, our current lack of strong state structures is what ensures that Poland remains peripheral. This is an issue we have already covered on many occasions. Instead of elaborating on it, I refer my readers to Jan Rokita’s report published by the Jagiellonian Club.

Secondly, the various parasitic interest groups present in the military should be dismantled, and a strong army should be built. Poland has an extremely large defence budget, which is smaller than that of Israel by only about 1/3, and which is larger than the defence budget of North Korea, Pakistan, Iran and Indonesia. These funds are not being utilised effectively. Before increasing spending, the system should be radically restructured so that the funds are used as intended. Conscription should make a return, as having 100-150 thousand soldiers is simply not enough in a country situated between Russia and Germany. We need to accelerate and rationalise the 2013-2022 army modernisation programme so that we acquire more technologies which contribute to our strategic independence, as well as purchasing modern equipment and focusing more on supporting our domestic defence industry. Finally, as Michał Kuź postulates in his articles for “NK”, we need a civilian nuclear programme which could eventually be expanded to include a military one.

The third part of the triad involves analogous (to those postulated within the context of defence) diplomatic actions and the reinventing of our foreign policy. Our current one, which is obsessed with being a second-class member of both the EU and NATO, may soon become bankrupt, if it has not become obsolete already. This time of great uncertainty requires a reformatting of strategic thinking from identitarian and axiological to geopolitical. In other words – we should marginalise our Prometheuses of democracy and human rights in favour of level-headed analysts who can identify how power is distributed. As an example, instead of thinking how to support the opposition in Belarus, we should look for ways to convince Minsk to join our side, regardless of who is in power.

We need to be clear that none of our traditional allies benefit from a strong Poland. It would upset the balance of power in Central and Eastern Europe, risk destabilising Russia (which, again, the West needs as a “sanctioned empire”), and result in a more or less rapid expulsion of western capital from the region. Moreover, if the international order were to be rearranged in this way, the attractiveness of Russia as an ally would become many times greater than that of Poland – even more so from the point of view of the U.S., Germany or France.

This time of rapid transformations necessitates that we constantly question our axioms and thought patterns. Let us model the situation: which of the superpowers stands to benefit from a strong Poland? Only one word comes to mind: China. Our country is a key element of the New Silk Road project. This is due to our optimal geography, as well as geopolitical aspects – Beijing would rather strengthen (by situating the hub infrastructure of the Road) a weaker state (us) than a stronger one (Germany). It is better to have many medium-sized partners than only a few large ones. In addition, Berlin’s natural proclivity towards Moscow and the way the two powers complement each other may also result in a powerful German-Russian alliance being formed on the Silk Road. It is also worth keeping in mind the words of the long-time President of the Poland-Asia Studies Centre, Radosław Pyffel: “a Great China and a Great Russia cannot exist at the same time”.

For Poland, the “One Belt, One Road” project is not only an opportunity to strengthen relations with the Chinese superpower. It is also an historic opportunity to reassert dominance over Eurasian land trade. Even with good access to the Baltic Sea, Poland will always be more of a land country – our sea is small, shallow and isolated, and our bare plains are vulnerable to invasion by land. If the New Silk Road turned out to be a success, our position in the international trade hierarchy would greatly increase.

Shades of uncertainty

To sum up, Poland needs more active, deft and flexible diplomacy, the kind of which has not been seen since Piłsudski. Relations with China should be strengthened, in addition to maintaining the best relations possible with the USA – we should sit on the fence for as long as we can. We should stop believing in the declarations made by our allies and instead invest into mutual interests. Pragmatism should be chosen over Prometheism, which includes eschewing the attitude of being more Catholic than the Pope himself when it comes to fighting radical Islam, which currently poses no threat to us, but may become one in the future. In this new era, Poland should be able to pivot more, which also involves tactically improving our relations with Russia should our Western friends prevent us from pursuing our interests.

As Józef Piłsudski was wont to say, “Poland will be great or she will not exist at all.” This statement becomes relevant again in our time of tectonic quakes shaking the international order. The opportunities are as great as the threats. We do not know how much time we have left – it is better to assume it is not much.

The translation was financed by the National Freedom Institute – Centre for Civil Society Development from the funds of The Civil Society Organisations Development Programme 2018-2030

 Tłumaczenie sfinansowano przez Narodowy Instytut Wolności – Centrum Rozwoju Społeczeństwa Obywatelskiego ze środków Programu Rozwoju Organizacji Obywatelskich na lata 2018-2030